

# DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS: WHAT IS CONGRESS GETTING FOR ITS MONEY?

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,  
DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES  
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON  
GOVERNMENT REFORM  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

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## **DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS: WHAT IS CONGRESS GETTING FOR ITS MONEY?**

**WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2004**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND  
HUMAN RESOURCES,  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Souder, Cummings, and Norton.

Staff present: J. Marc Wheat, staff director and chief counsel; Nicholas Coleman, professional staff member and counsel; John Stanton and David Thomasson, congressional fellows; Malia Holst, clerk; Tony Haywood, minority counsel; and Cecelia Morton, minority office manager.

Mr. SOUDER. The subcommittee hearing will come to order.

Good morning. Because of the consistent jurisdictional focus of this subcommittee on the President's National Drug Control Strategy, we pay very close attention to demand reduction, treatment, and drug supply and interdiction initiatives. Our oversight activities continually evaluate departmental authorizations, appropriations, and the efficiency and effectiveness of departmental efforts. The President's budget request, now before Congress, asks for approximately \$12.6 billion for the Strategy in 2005. The Department of Defense is to be appropriated almost 15 percent of that sum.

The most compelling reason for my tenacity in this regard is the loss of life due to drugs in my district and all over this great Nation. This year, more than 21,000 Americans died from drug-related causes. We have never lost this many Americans annually to a single military or terrorist campaign. This staggering statistic is significant when placed in perspective: we have lost in excess of 600 brave Americans in Iraq since Operation Enduring Freedom began, which is about 2.9 percent of those lost to drugs over the same period of time. We have lost more Americans to drugs than were killed in any single terrorist act to date. It is vitally important that we maintain vigorous efforts to control the sources of supply for narcotics and to interdict them before reaching the United States.

The Department of Defense has been appropriately authorized to conduct counternarcotics missions and was designated the lead department for many counternarcotics command, control, detection, monitoring, and training responsibilities in the 1989 DOD author-

ization bill, among other authorities. The Department has been appropriately funded in fiscal year 2003 with a final budget authority for DOD narcotics activities of \$905.9 million. Fiscal year 2004 saw an increase in the narcotics budget to \$908.6 million but the fiscal year 2005 budget request is \$852.7 million. In addition, the Department requested and received \$73 million in supplemental funds for counternarcotics activities in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. It remains unclear to me how that appropriation has reduced the growth, processing, transshipment, and availability or street price of drugs from Central Asia.

A significant problem is the allocation of national resources to counternarcotics missions. Many of our most significant interdiction assets are operated by the Department of Defense. The subcommittee staff received briefings at the Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West and at the U.S. Southern Command that suggest that the redirection of national resources away from drug control missions in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility to combat missions in the CENTCOM area of responsibility have had dire negative impacts on drug interdiction in the Western Hemisphere. Some detection and interception programs have only a minuscule proportion of the amount of resources that Government experts have deemed necessary for an adequate detection and interdiction program. This allocation of resources must be addressed vigorously and quickly by the Department of Defense.

Our witnesses today have some of the significant responsibilities for operational matters relating to narcotics supply reduction and interdiction, and I appreciate very much the opportunity to have them here to survey the status, effectiveness, and spending priorities of these critical programs. For example, many of these responsibilities are carried out in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility and specifically in the Andean Region. For several years, the U.S. Southern Command personnel have been training Colombian military pilots and the Counternarcotics Brigade. The expanded authorities in Colombia allow personnel and equipment to be employed against both narcotics and terrorist threats. This year, the Department has requested an increase in the personnel limitation in Colombia, to facilitate greater training opportunities, among other things. It is clear that we are seeing real and tangible successes in Colombia, and I very much appreciate the Command's efforts to support the counternarcotics efforts of President Uribe and Vice President Santos, with whom I have had the opportunity to spend a significant amount of time. The attorney general of the United States has indicted members of both the FARC and the AUC for using drug proceeds to support their terrorism.

I want to add one thing we learned just yesterday morning in Detroit, as we held a hearing on meth. At one point two big busts in Detroit were 40 percent of the meth precursors in the United States being shipped to California for the super labs, but the feeling of our Federal agencies is that the meth precursor chemicals, trafficking has shifted—not that the production has changed from Belgium and the Netherlands—but it has shifted to the south and to the west, coming from Asia and back up through the south. So when we effectively try to do homeland security at the borders, looking more closely for other things, and as we have transferred

agents up to the north, nearly a 50 percent increase in the Department of Homeland Security to the north border and those big crossings, we have another impact on counternarcotics, which puts more pressure on the two commands we have here today if it is coming through the Asian side or up through the southern side, and now not down through Canada. We are not absolutely convinced of that trend, but that is what we heard from the major Federal agencies yesterday in Detroit.

We will consider the Department's response to rapidly emerging new threats such as the connection between terrorist and drug trafficking organizations. The resumption of large-scale heroin production in Afghanistan breeds instability and directly funds terrorist groups. The President has announced to the world that terrorists and sponsoring nations are our enemies. What efforts are underway to destroy the funding source of these enemies? The eradication of opium poppy, the interdiction of precursor chemicals traffickers, and the destruction of the stockpiled drugs and processing facilities in Afghanistan directly carry out the intent of the Commander in Chief's National Drug Control Strategy.

Today we will try to determine more precisely what has been the focus of effort and the effect of the Department's counternarcotics program worldwide and what steps can be taken to ensure the adequacy of interdiction resources, and determine whether resources will ever return to previous levels. Clearly, our plate this morning is very full, and I welcome our witnesses. From the Department of Defense we have Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Mr. Thomas O'Connell, who also recently testified before the subcommittee on the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, and we welcome you back. The second panel, actually, we have combined you into one panel and appreciate Mr. O'Connell accommodating that. We have here representing the Combatant Commands, where most of our supply reduction is authorized and appropriated. Brigadier General Benjamin Mixon will speak for the U.S. Southern Command and Rear Admiral David Kunkel will speak for the U.S. Pacific Command. Unfortunately, our invited witnesses from the U.S. Central Command, which would include Afghanistan, was not available to testify, so we look forward to receiving the testimony separately in the future.

Certainly there is no lack of important issues for discussion, and I expect today's hearing to cover a wide range of pressing questions. We welcome all of you and I look forward to discussion.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]

Opening Statement  
Chairman Mark Souder

**“DOD Counternarcotics: What Is Congress Getting  
For Its Money?”**

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy  
and Human Resources  
Committee on Government Reform

April 21, 2004

Good Morning. Because of the consistent jurisdictional focus in the Subcommittee on the President's National Drug Control Strategy, we pay very close attention to demand reduction initiatives, treatment initiatives, and drug supply and interdiction initiatives. Our oversight activities continually evaluate departmental authorizations, appropriations, and the efficiency and effectiveness of departmental efforts. The President's budget request, now before Congress, asks for approximately \$12.6 Billion dollars for the Strategy in 2005. The Department of Defense is to be appropriated almost fifteen percent of that sum.

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same period of time. We've lost more Americans to drugs than were killed in any single terrorist act to date. It is vitally important that we maintain vigorous efforts to control the sources of supply for narcotics and to interdict them before reaching the United States.

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Our witnesses today have some of the significant responsibilities for operational matters relating to narcotics supply reduction and interdiction, and I would appreciate very much the opportunity to have them here to survey the status, effectiveness, and spending priorities of these critical programs. For example, many of these responsibilities are carried out in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility and specifically in the Andean Region. For several years, U.S. Southern Command personnel have been training Colombian military pilots and the Counternarcotics Brigade. The expanded authorities in Colombia allow personnel and equipment to be employed against both narcotics and terrorist threats. This year, the Department has requested an increase in the personnel limitation in Colombia, to facilitate greater training opportunities, among other things. It is clear that we are seeing real and tangible successes in Colombia, and I very much appreciate the Command's efforts. To support the counternarcotics efforts of President Uribe and Vice President Santos, with whom I've had the opportunity to spend a significant amount of time. The Attorney General of the United States has indicted members of both the FARC and the AUC for using drug proceeds to support their terrorism.

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There is certainly no lack of important issues for discussion and I expect today's hearing to cover a wide range of pressing questions. Welcome to all of you, and I look forward to the discussion.

Mr. SOUDER. I now yield to our ranking member, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

In both the past and the current fiscal year the Department of Defense received more than \$900 million for counter and drug activities that support the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy. Roughly half of this money supports international interdiction efforts, mainly focused on stopping the flow of cocaine and heroin from the Andean Region and Mexico into the United States.

Another important geographic area of focus is Afghanistan, the world's leading producer of heroin and the primary source of heroin destined for Europe. In both the Andean Region and Afghanistan, proceeds from drug cultivation, production and trafficking have been linked to terrorists, insurgent and criminal activities that aim to undermine efforts to achieve and sustain democracy and the rule of law abroad, and to harm American civilians at home.

Imported legal drugs destroy thousands of lives each year and destroy communities throughout these United States. The attacks on September 11 brought home the fact that foreign drug proceeds helped to advance the murderous objectives of terrorist organizations like al Qaeda. DOD counterdrug programs provide vital support for U.S. counterdrug and counternarco-terrorism activities in the areas of interdiction, intelligence, and detection and monitoring of drug smuggling routes and transit zones, often working in conjunction with Federal law enforcement agencies and allied militaries through task forces like the Joint Interagency Agency West.

DOD also provides important support to domestic drug control efforts such as through its internal demand reduction efforts and by providing training and other support to State and local law enforcement through the National Guard. Both domestically and internationally, the drug trade threatens stability, security, and the rule of law. And in both contexts, the post-September 11 focus on terror poses challenges that affect the way Federal dollars and resources are allocated to fight the war on terror and the war on drugs.

In Afghanistan, where opium production has skyrocketed since American forces removed the Taliban from power, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes has stressed that the war on terror and the war on drugs are in effect the same war, that the drug trade is the primary threat to security and stability in Afghanistan. If the Afghan drug trade is not attacked aggressively, UNODC has warned that Afghanistan could evolve again into a failed state, controlled this time by drug cartels and narcoterrorist organizations. Such an outcome would be disastrous not only for Afghanistan and its neighbors, but for the United States and our allies who are in the cross hairs of the terrorist organizations that would benefit from a lawless Afghanistan.

A similar situation exists in Colombia, where we have in effect collapsed the distinction between terrorist and drug organizations because of the interdependency that exists between the drug trade and the terrorists. A key distinction, however, is that as deeply as we have become involved in supporting Colombia's fight against narcoterrorism, American troops in Afghanistan are on the front lines, and this is unequivocally our war.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. military faces a difficult challenge in managing its overlapping mandates to fight war on terror and the

war on drugs on the same geographic fronts. The witnesses before us today are charged with managing that important challenge. I look forward to hearing their testimony concerning the role of the Department of Defense on fighting the war on drugs, and I am interested in hearing their views on how the military can or should adapt to fight the war on drugs and the war on terror in a more synergistic fashion in light of the clear linkages that have been established between the two.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me express my gratitude to the men and women in uniform who are charged with carrying out the military's mandates to protect our Nation from the twin threats of drugs and terrorism. We are deeply indebted to them for their courageous service to our Nation, and we thank them.

Thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to the testimony.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]

**Opening Statement of**

**Representative Elijah E. Cummings, D-Maryland  
Ranking Minority Member**

**Hearing on “Department of Defense and Counternarcotics:  
What Is Congress Getting for Its Money?”**

**Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources  
Committee on Government Reform  
U.S. House of Representatives  
108<sup>th</sup> Congress**

**April 21, 2004**

Mr. Chairman,

In both the past and the current fiscal year, the Department of Defense received more than 900 million dollars for counterdrug activities that support the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy. Roughly half of this money supports international interdiction efforts, mainly focused on stopping the flow of cocaine and heroin from the Andean Region and Mexico into the United States. Another important geographic area of focus is Afghanistan, the world’s leading producer of heroin and the primary source of heroin destined for Europe.

In both the Andean region and Afghanistan, proceeds from drug cultivation, production, and trafficking have been linked to terrorist, insurgent and criminal activities that aim to undermine efforts to achieve and sustain democracy and the rule of law abroad, and to harm Americans civilians at home. Imported illegal drugs destroy thousands of lives each year and destroy communities throughout the United States. The attacks of 9/11 brought home the fact that foreign drug proceeds help to advance the murderous objectives of terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda.

DOD counterdrug programs provide vital support for U.S. counterdrug and counter-narco-terrorism activities in the areas of interdiction, intelligence, and detection and monitoring of drug smuggling routes and transit zones, often working in conjunction with federal law enforcement agencies and allied militaries through task forces like the Joint Interagency Task Force West. DOD also provides important support to domestic drug control efforts, such as through its internal demand reduction efforts and by providing training and other support to state and local law enforcement through the National Guard.

Both domestically and internationally, the drug trade threatens stability, security, and the rule of law. And in both contexts the post 9-11 focus on terror poses challenges that affect the way federal dollars and resources are allocated to fight the war and terror and the war on drugs. In Afghanistan, where opium production has skyrocketed since American forces removed the Taliban from power, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes has stressed that the war on terror and the war on drugs are, in effect, the same war – that the drug trade is the primary threat to security and stability in Afghanistan. If the Afghan drug trade is not attacked aggressively, UNODC has warned, Afghanistan could devolve again into a failed state, controlled this time by drug cartels and narco-terrorist organizations. Such an outcome would be disastrous not only for Afghanistan and its neighbors but for the United States and our allies who are in the crosshairs of the terrorist organizations that would benefit from a lawless Afghanistan.

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Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me express my gratitude to the men and women in uniform who are charged with carrying out the military's mandates to protect our nation from the twin threats of drugs and terrorism. We are deeply indebted to them for their courageous service to our nation.

Thank you for holding this very important hearing.

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.

Before we move forward, I want to take a point of personal privilege and salute an important member of my staff, John Stanton. John came to our staff in December 2002 as a congressional fellow from what was then the U.S. Customs Service. It is now the U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement [ICE] Bureau of the Department of Homeland Security. As our staff expert on narcotics interdiction and related issues, John has provided us with excellent analysis and a wealth of experience. His assistance in setting up our subcommittee's hearings and briefings, his depth of knowledge of source zone issues in Colombia, Central Asia, and other regions, and perhaps, most important, his kindness and generosity to all of us who work with him have been invaluable.

John's career of public service began in 1979 with the U.S. Marine Corps, with whom he served 6 years. In 1989, he joined U.S. Army Special Forces and attained the rank of Captain. A graduate of the Emory-Riddle Aeronautical University, John flew with Eastern Airlines, then joined the U.S. Customs Service as a law enforcement officer and pilot in 1991. He has flown missions in nearly every type of aircraft owned by U.S. law enforcement and in such diverse locations as El Paso, TX; Tucson, AZ; Puerto Rico, Panama, Mexico, Colombia, and Peru.

Prior to joining our subcommittee staff, John was assigned to the operational staff of U.S. Customs headquarters. During his time there, John was placed in charge of air security for the 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake City, UT, coordinating between headquarters and agents in the field. Earlier this month, John was recalled for duty as a member of the U.S. Army Reserve and will be reporting to base next week. He is scheduled to serve in Iraq as part of our Nation's ongoing efforts to establish peace, justice, and democracy in that troubled region of the world.

John, it has been an honor to work with you. Please accept our heartfelt thanks for your service to this subcommittee and our best wishes for your continued success and our prayers for your safe return home.

I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing record, and that any answers to written questions provided by the witnesses also be included in the record. Without objection, it is so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents, and other materials referred to by Members and witnesses may be included in the hearing record, and that all Members be permitted to revise and extend their remarks. Without objection, so ordered.

As you all know, it is our standard practice to ask witnesses to testify under oath. Would you please rise so I can administer the oath?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that each of the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

We begin today with Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas O'Connell. Welcome back to our subcommittee. We very much were thrilled that your position was filled. We are glad you are at the

Department of Defense working with these issues and glad you could come again to talk today. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

**STATEMENTS OF TOM O'CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT; REAR ADMIRAL DAVID KUNKEL, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND; AND BRIGADIER GENERAL BENJAMIN MIXON, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND**

Mr. O'CONNELL. Chairman Souder, Representative Cummings, it is my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense programs and policies that assist nations around the world in their battle against narcoterrorism. I have a longer statement to be placed in the record, but I would like to briefly touch on the Department's counternarcotics efforts at home and abroad.

Chairman Souder and Representative Cummings, let me thank you for the excellent impressions of your opening remarks; both of you were right on the mark. And I would like to also thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing us to join together as one panel, and it is indeed a pleasure to serve with these two distinguished flag officers.

Fighting narcotics is a complex process that requires coordination and funding from all levels of government agencies, local and State, law enforcement, and the foreign countries we assist. We are increasingly aware of linkages between terrorist organizations, narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling, kidnapping rings, and other transnational networks. Terrorist groups such as the FARC in Colombia, al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and groups around the world can finance key operations with drug money.

The Department of Defense, with our counterparts in the Department of State and other Government agencies, seeks to systematically dismantle drug trafficking networks both to halt the flow of drugs into the United States and bolster the broader war on terrorism. The Department has requested roughly \$853 million for these efforts in fiscal year 2005. While this is lower than the total \$908 million appropriated in fiscal year 2004, this is due primarily to the \$73 million in funding added to this year's emergency supplemental to support our efforts in Afghanistan and in neighboring nations, and that is much appreciated. Our baseline fiscal year 2005 counternarcotics budget request includes resources to continue and sustain these efforts.

The Department is bolstering border security by providing communications systems for the border police, building police infrastructure in the border regions and improving information between law enforcement and military intelligence. Our activities are fully coordinated with, and in support of, the United Kingdom and the State Department. To support similar efforts in Colombia, the Department forwarded to the Congress a request for reprogramming \$50 million during this fiscal year. I am pleased to report that the Department will maintain its emphasis on Colombia by increasing our efforts in Colombia in fiscal year 2005 by \$43 million. This support will help President Uribe and his military execute Colombia's Plan Patriota as they extend a government presence in areas that have been isolated for decades. The Colombian military is now exe-

cutting a well coordinated and joint military campaign against the FARC. As you know, to better assist the Colombians, we and the State Department have asked for congressional support in raising the current personnel cap in Colombia.

In the Pacific Region, we are bolstering an already well established counternarcotics program in Southeast Asia, where our Asian partners face a challenging combination of terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, and a serious need for increased maritime security.

Our international counternarcotics support is predominantly in response to requests from our principal partners, the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Administration. It includes deployments and programs to train and furnish intelligence and operational support for drug detection monitoring and provide equipment to partnering counterdrug forces.

Domestically, the Department continues to work through the U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard with the Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement agencies to coordinate counternarcotics efforts in the United States. The National Guard is an exceptional partner to law enforcement in domestic counternarcotics missions, requiring militarily-unique skills, including air-ground recognizance, intelligence analysis, and training for law enforcement agencies. The Department is maintaining our National Guard support to law enforcement along the southwest border and adding linguist translation centers in California and Washington to capitalize on the language skills of our guardsmen in those areas.

In terms of the Department's demand reduction efforts, it is our continuing view that illegal drug use is incompatible with a service member's sensitive and dangerous duties. The Department's demand reduction policy sets minimum testing rates at 100 percent, meaning each service member is tested at an average of once per year. Increased drug testing began in fiscal year 2005, with a goal of reaching 100 percent testing for all military and civilian personnel by fiscal year 2006. This cost-effective drug testing, along with punitive consequences for service members who are identified as drug users will continue to deter drug use amongst military personnel and help ensure the readiness of our armed forces.

I would like to thank you, Chairman Souder, Representative Cummings and members of the committee, for the tremendous support you have provided to the Department. I look forward to answering your questions. And as an aside, I would just like to add my personal thanks and best wishes to John Stanton, who will be joining the Special Operations community. We salute his past service and wish him well as he goes in harm's way.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connell follows:]

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STATEMENT BY  
THOMAS W. O'CONNELL  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND  
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

BEFORE THE  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

108<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD APRIL 21, 2004

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS BUDGET

Chairman Davis, Representative Waxman, distinguished members of the Committee, it is my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense programs and policy that assist nations around the world in their battle against narcoterrorism. I value the work that you do and congratulate you on your continued leadership.

Each year, my office expends a great deal of time, effort, and resources to keep drugs from crossing our borders. This is a complex process that requires coordination and funding from all levels of government agencies, local and state law enforcement, and the foreign countries in which we assist. We recognize that a portion of the profits from drug sales either directly or indirectly support terrorist organizations – another reason we are working hard to reduce the supply of drugs around the world.

Illegal drug use exacts a heavy toll on American society every year. They account for billions of dollars in direct and indirect costs including health care, lost revenue due to crime, social welfare costs and lost productivity. While cocaine continues to be the single most serious drug threat, heroin, synthetic drugs, methamphetamines, and marijuana are also serious, and in some cases, increasing problems.

Global and regional terrorists are threatening United States interests. Terrorist groups such as the FARC in Colombia, the Taliban and other extremist groups in Afghanistan, support their operations with drug money. Members of al Qa'ida can also benefit from the drug business by working with drug smugglers and financiers. The Department of Defense, with our counterparts in the Department of State and other government agencies, seeks to systematically dismantle drug trafficking networks, both

to halt the flow of drugs into the United States, and to bolster the broader war on terrorism effort.

Domestically, the Department continues to work through U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard with the Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement agencies to coordinate counternarcotics efforts. The National Guard is an exceptional partner to law enforcement in domestic counternarcotics missions requiring military-unique skills, including air/ground reconnaissance, intelligence analysts, and training for law enforcement agencies. The Department is maintaining our National Guard support to law enforcement along the Southwest Border, and adding linguist centers in California and Washington.

#### **The Counternarcotics Budget**

In accordance with statutory authorities, we use counternarcotics resources as effectively and efficiently as possible to achieve national and Department counternarcotics priorities. We focus on programs that fulfill statutory responsibilities and use military-unique resources and capabilities, and continue to advance the national priorities of the National Drug Control Strategy. Our counternarcotics authorities and funding are an effective combination that supports war on terrorism efforts and the implementation of the Department's Security Cooperation Guidance, which outlines the strategic priorities of the Department.

The Department's July 31, 2002 counternarcotics policy guidance states that the Department will execute drug detection and monitoring and other programs using

military command, control, communications and intelligence resources, as well as military operational planning capabilities. This year we have issued new Demand Reduction, Domestic Support and International Support counter-narcoterrorism policies that have expanded upon this definition. We focus on counternarcotics activities that will contribute to:

- The war on terrorism;
- Security Cooperation Guidance;
- Military readiness; and
- National Security.

In order to best characterize and describe the support DoD provides, the Department defined four mission areas to encompass the scope of the Department's program. These mission areas are:

- Demand Reduction: Drug testing, treatment, and outreach
- Domestic Support: Active duty counternarcotics support, National Guard State Plans, National Guard schools, Aerostat radars
- Intelligence and Technology Support: SIGINT collection and processing, intelligence support and analysis, CN research and development
- International Support: Detection and monitoring, intelligence support and analysis, equipment, training, and infrastructure

The Department provides, through Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, and the Defense Agencies, unique military personnel, systems, and

capabilities that support domestic law enforcement agencies and foreign security forces involved in counternarcotics activities, including efforts to counter activities that aid, benefit from, or are related to narcotics trafficking. This broad-scope support is provided primarily under the authorities contained in 10 U.S. Code §§ 124, 371-374, 379-381, 2576, 2576a, Title 32 U.S. Code, § 112, Section 1004, National Defense Authorization Act for 1991, as amended; and Section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 1998, as amended.

With finite funds and resources, multiple missions to address, and numerous requests for assistance, the Department must establish priorities for its support mission. The areas that receive resources must be where Defense capabilities will provide the highest impact on the drug threat while at the same time contributing to the war on terrorism and enhancing national security. DoD's efforts will be continually evaluated based on the changing drug threat and participating nations' needs.

The Department's program request of \$852.7 million for FY 2005 for the Central Transfer Account (CTA) reflects price growth of \$11.4 million and a program decrease of \$67.3 million over the FY 2004 level of \$908.6 million, which primarily reflects the FY 2004 congressional increases to the Department's counter-narcoterrorism program. The Department's FY 2005 counternarcotics budget will continue to fund, within fiscal constraints, an array of unique and effective programs that support the National Drug Control Strategy and Department goals.

#### **Demand Reduction**

Illegal drugs are readily available to Department members and their use is incompatible with members' security sensitive and dangerous duties. During the past decade, use of prohibited drugs in the United States civilian community, especially by young citizens, has increased, prompting the President to establish a goal of reducing drug use by 25% over each three year period.

The Department has assimilated the President's goal of a 25% reduction in drug use over three years into its strategic plan. The approach emphasizes prevention of drug use through pre-accession and random drug testing, anti-drug education and treatment. Emphasis is placed on deterring drug use through cost effective drug testing with punitive consequences for members who are identified as drug users.

In accordance with the Department of Defense Demand Reduction policy, we plan to increase drug testing for all military members to a minimum average testing rate for each Service, the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard of one test per member per year[s2]. [s3]This increase will be incrementally phased in though the outyears. We also plan to increase drug testing for civilian employees in testing designated positions to a minimum average testing rate for each Agency or Component of one test per testing designated employee per year.[s4]

A total of \$19.4 million is for the National Guard State Plans and Service outreach programs, and the Young Marines outreach program, and \$102.7 million is for the continued support of the Department of Defense Demand Reduction Programs.

#### **Domestic Support**

Since 1989, domestic law enforcement agencies at the State, local and Federal levels have requested military support for their respective counternarcotics operations. Domestic counternarcotics operations have historically included support for interdiction of cocaine, marijuana and methamphetamines coming into the United States; interdiction of illegal drugs transiting the United States; identification of domestic marijuana grows and methamphetamine labs; identification and arrest of drug manufacturers, traffickers and distributors; and the prevention of drug use among America's youth.

We work closely with USNORTHCOM and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)) on counternarcotics support to domestic law enforcement. The focus of this support is managed through Joint Task Force Six in El Paso, Texas, which provides active duty and reserve missions in areas of engineering support, aerial and ground reconnaissance, transportation and logistics support and intelligence. These counternarcotics missions provide excellent training in real world situations and enhance domestic security.

Additionally, the Department is committed to improving information sharing between DoD and law enforcement agencies in support of counternarcotics objectives. DoD is installing classified computer systems and networks in High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area intelligence centers, operated by National Guard intelligence analysts; and active duty and Reserve members are playing an integral role in arrival zone detection and monitoring, cross-agency intelligence fusion, and the development of actionable intelligence.

A total of \$219.5M supports federal, state and local drug law enforcement agencies' (DLEAs) requests for domestic operational and logistical support, and will assist the DLEAs in their efforts to reduce drug-related crime. Of this amount, \$151.1 million is for a portion of the total National Guard State Plans that supports domestic law enforcement efforts and the counter-narcoterrorism schools; \$20.3 million is for Domestic Operational Support, such as US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) counter-narcoterrorism support to DLEAs and Title 10 National Guard translation efforts; \$32.3M is for domestic detection and monitoring efforts (Tethered Aerostats); and \$15.8 million is for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) support, such as ADNET.

#### **Intelligence and Technology Support**

The basic nature of the smuggling threat mandates the need for actionable intelligence if the Department is to be effective in detection, monitoring and interdiction operations. The Department will continue to provide critical intelligence support to national policies designed to dismantle narcotics trafficking and international terrorist organizations benefiting from drug trafficking. These intelligence support programs make use of unique Defense capabilities, systems, skills, and expertise, and directly support the National Drug Control Strategy.

Use of new technology continues to be instrumental in combating narcoterrorist activities. The Department will continue to test, evaluate, develop and deploy technologies that are used to collect and survey suspect narcoterrorist smuggling

operations in air, land, or sea. Wide area surveillance will be a technology challenge as legacy systems such as Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) have surpassed lifecycle expectations and will require major hardware and software replacement to lower the risk of system failure. The program will pursue merging disparate data and sensor feeds into a common operating picture, to provide worldwide counternarcotics intelligence and operational awareness.

RINGOLD translation support will be expanded to include additional languages critical to the Global War on Terrorism. THROTTLE CAR is a critical data warehousing effort jointly funded by the Department of Defense and the Drug Enforcement Administration. Capabilities will be increased to accommodate capacity increases and ensure readiness.

A total of \$103.3M will be used for intelligence programs to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate information required for counter-narcoterrorism operations. Technology programs increase the Department's abilities to target narco-terrorist activity. A total of \$58.6 million is for counter-narcoterrorism intelligence support and analysis; \$21.1 million is for signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection and processing; \$10.0 million is for Service and SOCOM command and control programs; and \$13.7 million is for CN Technology efforts.

### **International Support**

Financial, political and operational linkages exist among narcotics trafficking, smuggling, and the global expansion of terrorism. Since September 11, 2001, the

Department has expanded its CNT mission to include targeting those terrorists groups worldwide that use narcotics trafficking to support terrorist activities. In order to support the War on Terrorism, DoD CNT uses its resources in regions where terrorists benefit from illicit drug revenue and know-how, and is working to bolster already well-established CNT efforts in USPACOM, particularly in SE Asia where the U.S. and its Asian partners face a challenging combination of terrorism/extremism, drug trafficking, and serious need for increased maritime security.

In the USCENTCOM area of operation, terrorists/extremists in Afghanistan and neighboring countries, and some local Afghan commanders benefit from the illegal narcotics trade. The Department is beginning to implement its Afghanistan counternarcotics assistance in ways that will provide direct payoffs for our counterterrorism objectives. We are bolstering border security, aiming at restricting and interdicting the movement of narcotics and terrorists, by providing communications systems for the Border Police, building up the police infrastructure in border regions with Pakistan, and improving some border entry points. We are expanding cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence. We are providing equipment to improve the capabilities of the existing Afghan interdiction forces, which have been trained by our British allies. In all of these efforts, we are working closely with USCENTCOM and with Coalition forces in Afghanistan, as well as with the U.S. Embassy. In other countries in Central Asia and the Middle East, USCENTCOM is currently expanding its counter-narcoterrorism efforts to curb the transit of illicit drugs through international smuggling corridors. We thank you, therefore for the \$73 million in funding added in

this year's emergency supplemental to support our efforts in Afghanistan and neighboring nations. Our FY05 CN budget requests resources to sustain these efforts.

A total of \$40.8M will be used for Emerging Threats support efforts in the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) to detect, interdict, disrupt or curtail activities related to substances, material, weapons or resources used to finance, support, secure, cultivate, process or transport illegal drugs. \$29.0 million supports operations in those AORs, including Section 1033 support; \$11.8 million is for AOR Command and Control support.

Cocaine is the primary drug threat in the United States due to its high demand, availability, high rate of overdose, and its relation to violence. In 2002, there was an estimated 250 metric tons of cocaine consumed in the U.S. There were approximately 2 million people age 12 and older using cocaine in the U.S. in 2002. Each user consumed approximately 34 grams of cocaine a year.

Cocaine consumed in the United States originates from coca plants grown in South America. The average potential production of cocaine produced in South America in 2003 was over 835 metric tons. Of this amount, approximately 612 metric tons of export quality cocaine departed South America. Approximately 422 metric tons of cocaine were exported to the U.S. and another 190 metric tons went to Europe. After cocaine seizures and consumption throughout the Transit Zone that were en route to the U.S., some 230 metric tons of export-quality cocaine were available in U.S. markets in 2003.

Colombia produced approximately 460 metric tons of 100% pure cocaine in 2003. Cocaine base produced in other countries, primarily Peru and Bolivia, is transported across the border into Colombia to be processed into HCl cocaine. The processed cocaine is then shipped/exported through other bordering countries or through the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific to the final destination. Over 500 maritime shipments depart Colombia annually, equating to almost two shipments a day. Of the cocaine that enters the United States, 77% passes through the Mexico/Central America corridor. Another 22% moves through the Caribbean corridor, and 1% comes directly from South America.

Colombia offers a unique window of opportunity with congressional approval of expanded authority and the aggressive leadership of President Uribe. The Administration continues to support President Uribe in seeking a secure and democratic Colombia, including providing resources in support of Colombia's Plan Patriota.

Supplemental funding (\$34M) in FY 2003 was provided by Congress for DoD support to Colombia initiatives. With existing funds and the additional supplemental funding, USSOUTHCOM increased support to the Colombian military, adding to their capability through a variety of programs. These programs provided critical support in logistics, mobility, light infantry operations, riverine operations, command, control and communications, at-sea interception, maintenance, security, base operations support, intelligence collection and dissemination. Congress extended expanded authority to support Colombia's counternarcotics and counter-terrorist efforts for FY 2004. We plan to increase assistance for the Colombian military during FY 2004 and FY 2005.

USSOUTHCOM developed a support package to provide needed assistance to the Colombian military. This funding will continue to support and expand upon programs already established during FY 2003 and will focus on increasing the Colombian military's capability in mobility, logistics, operationalizing intelligence, planning assistance, medical evacuation and care, secure communications, and security. To support these efforts in Colombia, the Department will soon be forwarding to the Congress a request for reprogramming \$50 million during this fiscal year. I am pleased to report that the Department will maintain this emphasis on Colombia by increasing our efforts in Colombia in FY05 by \$43 million.

A total of \$366.9M will support efforts in the USSOUTHCOM AOR, including detection and monitoring operations to assist U. S. law enforcement agencies to counter the flow of drugs in transit into the United States, and supporting nations (such as Colombia) to fight narcoterrorism. A total of \$173.0 million is for detection and monitoring platforms and assets; \$142.5 million is for operational Support; and \$51.4 million is for AOR command and control support, including Joint Interagency Task Force South.

Current legislation purports to limit the U.S. presence in Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 contractors. USSOUTHCOM manages this on a daily basis, often canceling or postponing personnel travel to Colombia. To date, the impact has been small. However, in the coming year as the Colombian military will be conducting full-scale operations across the country, the personnel cap will begin to have a deleterious effect on the mission. While U.S. personnel will not be directly on the front lines, more

training and planning assistance will be required for the Colombian military, since they will be directly engaged on a broader front to defeat the narcoterrorists. We should support this effort with manning that reflects the current and future situation on the ground. Reserving the President's Constitutional authority to deploy our military as he feels necessary, the Administration believes that we will need up to 800 military and 600 contractor personnel in Colombia over the next year.

**Conclusion**

The Department appreciates Congress's continued support of the counternarcotics program. I thank you, Chairman Davis, Representative Waxman and the Members of the Committee for the tremendous support you have provided. I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Admiral Kunkel.

Admiral KUNKEL. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the Joint Interagency Task Force West's counterdrug initiatives and the role we play in helping the U.S. Pacific Command, USPACOM, achieve enhanced security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Joint Interagency Task Force West stood up in 1989 as a subordinate command to USPACOM serving as its executive agent in counterdrug programs. The command has a distinguished record of providing DOD unique resources to Federal law enforcement agencies in support of their efforts to detect and monitor drug shipments and providing actionable intelligence, enabling U.S. law enforcement to interdict those shipments. Specifically, the command has directly contributed to the seizure or disruption of over 240 metric tons of cocaine with an estimated value of \$5 billion. During fiscal year 2003, a ASPIC/USSOUTHCOM agreement realigned responsibilities allowing JIATF West to relinquish its counterdrug efforts in the eastern Pacific to JIATF South in order to focus our resources entirely toward Asia.

JIATF West provides support to various U.S. Country Teams in embassies throughout the Asia-Pacific region. This support includes unique analytical capability, as well as training and facility improvements which enhance the professionalism and capabilities of partner nation police and military units with a counterdrug mission. Our goal is to facilitate effective interagency cooperation and multilateral application of effort to reduce and contain drug trafficking.

To further integrate JIATF West programs with other USPACOM components, Admiral Fargo directed the relocation of JIATF West to USPACOM headquarters during fiscal year 2004. This relocation is ongoing and the JIATF West command staff will be in place in June. We expect JIATF West to achieve full operational capability in Hawaii by December of this year.

Let me conclude these remarks by saying we anticipate the activities of JIATF West will expand significantly over the next 5 years in conjunction with USPACOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan and Regional Maritime Security Initiative, and these activities will complement Department of State programs in the region.

Thank you for your support and the opportunity to testify before your committee.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Kunkel follows:]

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

STATEMENT OF  
REAR ADMIRAL DAVID W. KUNKEL, U.S. COAST GUARD  
DIRECTOR  
JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE WEST  
BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES  
ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS  
21 APRIL 2004

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the Joint Interagency Task Force West's counterdrug initiatives and the role they play in helping the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) achieve enhanced security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) West stood up in 1989 as a subordinate command to USPACOM serving as its executive agent for counterdrug programs. The command has a distinguished record of providing DOD unique resources to federal law enforcement agencies in support of their efforts to detect and monitor drug shipments and providing actionable intelligence enabling US law enforcement to interdict those shipments. Specifically, the command has directly contributed to the seizure or disruption of over 240 metric tons of cocaine with an estimated value of 5 billion dollars. During FY03, a USPACOM/USSOUTHCOM agreement realigned responsibilities allowing JIATF West to relinquish its counterdrug efforts in the eastern Pacific to JIATF South in order to focus our resources entirely toward Asia.

JIATF West provides support to various US Country Teams in embassies throughout the Asia-Pacific region. This support includes unique analytical capability as well as training and facility improvements which enhance the professionalism and capabilities of Partner Nation police and military units with a counterdrug mission. Our goal is to facilitate effective interagency cooperation and multilateral application of effort to reduce and contain drug trafficking.

To further integrate JIATF West programs with other USPACOM components, JIATF-W will relocate from Alameda to PACOM headquarters during FY04. This

relocation is ongoing and the JIATF West command staff will be in place in June. We expect JIATF West to achieve full operational capability in Hawaii by December of this year.

Let me conclude these remarks by saying we anticipate the activities of JIATF West will expand significantly over the next five years in conjunction with USPACOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan and Regional Maritime Security Initiative, and these activities will complement Department of State programs in the region. Thank you for your support and the opportunity to testify before your committee.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

General Mison, Southern Command.

General MISON. Yes, sir. Thank you. If I may make an off-the-cuff comment in reference to the effect of drugs on the United States per your comment. We at U.S. Southern Command view drugs and its movement into the United States as a weapon of mass destruction, and we treat it accordingly. And I think my comments will focus on that particular aspect.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Cummings, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for allowing me a few minutes to make some opening comments.

We at U.S. Southern Command are fully committed to meeting DOD's responsibilities in the fight against drugs and narcoterrorists. We fulfill these responsibilities through detection and monitoring programs, close interagency coordination, and military support to partner nations. Our programs cover the entire SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, including Central and South America and the Caribbean Basin.

Our principal agent in the planning and execution of the detection and monitoring effort leading to the end game, that being interdiction and apprehension, is the National Joint Interagency Task Force South, or JIATF South. JIATF South is a one-of-a-kind premier organization of excellence for multiservice, multinational, and multiagency support to the counterdrug mission. Their operations in conjunction with USSOUTHCOM deliver an integrated approach to meeting DOD mission sets in the war against drugs and narcoterrorists.

Colombia is the source zone of 90 percent of the cocaine and 70 percent of their heroin here in the United States, and much of our efforts are necessarily centered there. Still, we recognize the importance of the transient zones of Central America, the Pacific and the Caribbean, as well as the source zones in Bolivia and Peru as our other focus areas. Our efforts in Central America include daily interdiction efforts, where we have conducted 18 major surge counterdrug operations last year.

We remain strong partners with our Caribbean friends. We have also deployed counterdrug training teams to Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru as the primary source countries assisting Colombia in their fight continues to be in the United States' best interest and a top priority for U.S. Southern Command. In close coordination with the U.S. Department of State, we continue to provide a full range of support to the Colombian Government, its security forces and its people. This includes training and equipping of both the military and police, assisting the Ministry of Defense with development of a modern budget and logistic organizations, assisting them in their narcoterrorist demobilization programs, and providing humanitarian assistance to populations most dramatically affected by this narcoterrorist war.

Two of our most successful training and equipment programs remain the extensive support we have provided the Colombian Army's Counternarcotics Brigade and the Infrastructure Security Strategy Program, which has dramatically reduced the number of narcoterrorist attacks on Colombia's northern oil infrastructure. I would like to emphasize that all of our training and advising pro-

grams operate under strict rules of engagement that prohibits U.S. military personnel from actually participating in combat operations. In other words, they operate from a secure base.

The continuation of expanded authorities is the single most important factor for us to continue building success in Colombia. This legislation has allowed us to use funds that were once only available for strictly defined counterdrug activities to provide assistance to the government of Colombia for a coordinated campaign against the narcoterrorist and its legal eagle armed groups who fuel the drug trade. The granting of expanded authority was an important recognition that no meaningful distinction can be made between the terrorists and drug traffickers in our region. All three of Colombia's terrorist groups are deep into the illicit narcotics business.

Measures of effectiveness are very difficult to gage in the counterterrorist mission, but over the last several years we have seen some encouraging results. As you know, we recently restarted the Air-Bridge Denial Program in Colombia. Since the program restarted, there have been 14 aircrafts forced down, 11 of those destroyed on the ground, and 7.9 metric tons of drugs seized.

In Colombia, the primary source zone country, our support to the Colombian security forces has also resulted in good results. Using calendar year 2002 and 2003 data, which roughly corresponds to the inception of expanded authorities, the Colombian security forces have experienced dramatic successes in all fronts. A few examples: In 2003, the homicide rate has been the lowest since 1987, approximately 52 per 100,000 capita; the capture of over a dozen mid-level members and one senior level member of the FARC leadership; restoration of the Government of Colombia's presence in all of Colombia's 1,098 municipalities; and a 48 percent reduction in the terrorist attacks on Colombia's infrastructure. Most important, the people of Colombia feel free to move about their country under this new level of security.

As these indicators demonstrate, we have been increasingly successful; however, we have been able to achieve these results with a decrease in both surface and air interdiction and detection assets due to the demands in prosecuting the global war on terror worldwide. We have continued to be increasingly successful due to a better information sharing, better information flow, and improved granularity of information coming from United States, European, Latin American law enforcement agencies. Also, our European allies have provided air and maritime assets to offset some of our shortfalls.

In conclusion, we continue to press forward successfully in our fight against narcoterrorists in the drug trade. We are encouraged by Colombia's success and recognize that they are at a critical point in their history, which is central to our counternarcotics fight. Under the leadership of President Uribe, who enjoys a very high approval rating, approximately 75 to 80 percent of the population, the military and police have regained areas long held by the narcoterrorists. They have also dealt serious blows to the leadership of these groups and have embarked on a strategic offensive to dismantle the FARC. Our commitment to support them at this juncture is critical. We will also continue our efforts in the rest of SOUTHCOM's AOR, understanding that despite our focus on Co-

lombia, our other missions in the transient and remaining source companies will be key to success.

I appreciate this opportunity to highlight the great counter-narcotics work done by the men and women at U.S. Southern Command and all they are doing in the interest of regional and United States and national security. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Mixon follows:]

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WRITTEN STATEMENT OF  
BRIGADIER GENERAL BENJAMIN MIXON, UNITED STATES ARMY  
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND  
BEFORE THE 108<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

21 APRIL 2004



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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN  
RESOURCES

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the United States Southern Command's role in assisting Colombia with its battle against narcoterrorism. Every day your soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians at Southern Command are working hard and employing their skills to accomplish our missions in this vital endeavor. We are shoring up our own national security by addressing this challenge at this time and in this place. Simultaneously we are laying the groundwork to promote and maintain future security and stability.

Colombia is at a decisive point in their fight. We are seeing steady progress toward establishing security and stability in Colombia and we are confident the Government of Colombia will continue to do so under President Uribe. President Uribe is a man of vision, principle, and substance. He is inculcating his government and his armed forces with an aggressive spirit and belief they can win the war against the narcoterrorists and end the violence. But the momentum he has built and the progress Colombia has shown is reversible. Consequently, we must maintain our steady, patient support in order to reinforce the successes we have seen and to guarantee a tangible return on the significant investment our country has made to our democratic neighbor.

To outline United States Southern Command's efforts in this endeavor, I will discuss the status of Southern Command's support of Plan Colombia, the progress we are seeing in Colombia, our activities with the Andean Ridge countries and the way ahead. Assisting Colombia in their fight continues to be in our own best interest. A secure Colombia will benefit fully from democratic processes and economic growth, prevent narcoterrorist spillover, and serve as a regional example. Conversely, a failed Colombia,

serving as a safe haven for narcoterrorists and international terrorists, would be a most unwelcome regional model. The center of gravity right now is in Colombia, and the future health of the region hinges upon what happens there. While this is Colombia's fight to win, we have the opportunity to tip the balance by augmenting their efforts decisively with our unwavering support.

#### **U.S. Southern Command's Support to Plan Colombia**

Plan Colombia is a six-year plan designed to defeat the threat the Colombians face. This threat continues to come from the three largest illegal armed groups in Colombia, all named on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations and two named on the President's list of drug kingpins: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC, the National Liberation Army or ELN, and the United Self-Defense Forces or AUC. While these groups may retain fragments of their founding philosophies, they appear to have jettisoned ideology in favor of terrorist methods and narcotrafficking.

Narcoterrorism threaten the stability of several nations in Latin America and the Caribbean and erodes the very fabric of democracy by spawning terrorism, corrupting public institutions, promoting criminal activity, undermining legitimate economies, and disrupting social order. The violence and corruption not only threatens our neighbors, it poses a direct national security threat to our homeland. Illicit drug abuse is certainly a multi-faceted problem, but our support to Plan Colombia is effectively addressing one of its most critical components.

Our role at Southern Command is to support implementation of the military aspects of the plan. The plan addresses the entire depth of Colombia's complex problem, however,

and is by no means envisioned as a simple military solution. As you know, various other U.S. government agencies and departments received funding to support both military and non-military aspects of Plan Colombia.

Colombia is just completing the fourth year of this six-year plan. The first phase of their three-phased plan focused on the Putumayo and Caqueta Departments of Southern Colombia where approximately half of Colombia's coca cultivation took place and lasted from December 2000 until December 2002. That phase consisted of challenging illegal armed groups, finding and destroying cocaine laboratories, and providing security for intensive aerial eradication of coca, the principal bill payer for narco-terrorism in Colombia. Southern Command was responsible primarily for training and equipping a Counter Narcotics Brigade, fielding Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters and also training pilots and crews during the first phase. Secondary efforts provided for infrastructure upgrades, riverine training, and counterdrug intelligence support. In Phase II, the Colombians are expanding the size of the armed forces, working with neighboring countries for combined operations, building forests where coca once grew, and creating units comprised of campesino soldiers to help guard towns where government presence was formerly lacking. These initiatives support continued drug eradication and interdiction. Phase III of Plan Colombia culminates the entire plan by expanding the government presence and control nationwide. While it is still too early to predict the exact end state of Plan Colombia, the progress we are seeing is a positive development that promises to complete that plan and institutionalize its successes.

**Counter Narcotics Brigade**

The Counter Narcotics Brigade (CN Brigade) headquarters and its three battalions are the best-trained and equipped conventional units in the Colombian Army. Its mission is to conduct ground, riverine, and air assault offensive operations against narcoterrorist organizations and provide ground security for aerial eradications. U.S. military personnel conducted staff and light infantry training for almost 2,300 troops. In accordance with Plan Colombia, the CN Brigade was originally designed to operate in southern Colombia. The CN Brigade has had impressive results during drug interdiction operations in that part of the country by destroying coca processing labs, providing security to eradication operations, and seizing chemical precursors and coca leaf. Most recently, the CN Brigade captured Nayibe Rojas Valdarrama, aka "Sonia" Chief of Finances and Logistics for the FARC Southern Bloc. Her capture has led to numerous other related arrests and has degraded the FARC's ability to conduct narco trafficking.

The Colombian military synchronized the deployments of the CN Brigade in Phase I with Colombian National Police and Department of State eradication efforts. The Office of National Drug Control Policy found that Colombia's coca cultivation decreased by 21 percent in 2003 from 2002. Because of its success in the Putumayo and Caqueta Departments, this brigade is now also being used beyond its original scope in other parts of the country, most notably the Nariño Department. We continue to provide sustainment training to the CN Brigade. In 2003, this unit transformed its organizational structure to become more flexible and deployable to plan and conduct offensive operations throughout the entire country.

**Helicopters**

Since December 2000, the United States has provided air mobility to the first CN Brigade using a company of 28 UH-1Ns with a combination of Colombian and Department of State contracted pilots. The UH-1N aircraft are based in Tolemaida with the Colombian Army Aviation Battalion and are forward deployed to Larandia for operations. The current operational focus remains providing air mobility support for counterdrug operations as well as selected counter-narcoterrorism operations. Delivery of the 25 Plan Colombia Huey IIs was completed in September 2002. These helicopters are also based at Tolemaida and currently focused on supporting pilot training and infrastructure security. All fourteen UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters procured under Plan Colombia for the Colombian military began operations in January 2003 after a thorough program of pilot training. These helicopters also support the CN Brigade, pilot training, and infrastructure security. While the Department of State is responsible for program oversight and funding for operations and contract maintenance for all of these helicopters, quality control is provided by a U.S. Army Technical Assistance Field Team. The Department of Defense retains responsibility for training Colombian Army pilots, crew chiefs and aviation unit maintenance personnel to fly and maintain Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters. The maintenance programs are supplemented by a safety initiative that integrates risk management planning into air operations. Overall, these helicopters have given the Colombian military unprecedented mobility. This mobility allows an increasingly well-trained Colombian Army to maneuver across a rugged landscape, in parts of the country they have not operated in for years, resulting in greater operational effectiveness against the narcoterrorists.

### **Engineer and Infrastructure Support**

The Plan Colombia supplemental appropriation allowed us to complete large-scale infrastructure improvements that greatly accelerated the development of increased operational capabilities for Colombia's forces. In subsequent years, we have continued to provide necessary facilities to support our training and equipping programs. Among our more significant engineer projects were the expansion of both fixed-wing and helicopter facilities at Tres Esquinas, the establishment of a comprehensive helicopter pilot training school at Melgar and Tolemaida, improved port facilities at Buenaventura, development of riverine support and maintenance facilities at Tres Esquinas and La Tagua, and the development of helicopter operational and support facilities at Larandia. We are moving now to develop the logistics infrastructure needed to support Colombian forces as they move outward to re-establish government control throughout Colombia. We just completed and turned over a hangar that will improve the operational rate of the Colombian C-130 fleet by improving their maintenance program. Additionally, in September 2003, we awarded contracts to establish logistics support centers, motorpools and maintenance facilities. As a direct result of the completion of these facilities, Colombian forces will be better able to conduct and sustain forward operations.

### **Professionalism and Human Rights**

Embedded within the training Southern Command and U.S. forces provide under Plan Colombia is the institutionalization of human rights and the respect for law by the Colombian military. We have helped the Colombian Ministry of Defense institute legal reforms through the creation of a Military Penal Justice Corps, similar to the U.S.

military's Judge Advocate General's corps. On July 29, 2003, the permanent facility for Colombia's new Armed Forces School of International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights, and Military Justice opened. This school teaches human rights and international humanitarian law to attorneys, commanders, officers, and sergeants. Additionally, hundreds of military, police, and civilian lawyers have received continued professional legal education beyond that provided at the school. The Colombian military legal corps, similar to the method used by our armed forces, is also becoming embedded with the field units of the Army in order to provide on the spot legal advice to commanders during operations.

United States Southern Command continues to support Colombian efforts to extend human rights training throughout its ranks. Colombia is fighting its illegal armed groups justly, in accordance with democratic values and human rights. This is instrumental in what we are collectively striving to achieve.

Under President Uribe's "Democratic Security Policy" extrajudicial executions in 2003 were down 48 percent, assassinations were down 41 percent, homicides of trade unionists were down 68 percent and forced displacements were down 68 percent. Further, none of the units U.S. forces and trained have been accused of human rights abuses. I am confident that President Uribe and the Colombian military have taken human rights to heart, unlike their adversaries, who commit the vast majority of human rights abuses. Alleged human rights abuses by Colombian security forces are now less than two percent of those reported and the institutionalization of respect for human rights continues.

In 2003, as members of the illegal armed groups demobilized, over 77 percent turned themselves into government forces. If they suspected that they would be subject to

torture and abuse, they would have turned themselves into non-governmental organizations and the Church as they did in years past, before human rights became an integral part of the Colombian military's ethos. The Colombian government is not resorting to rural concentration camps, peasant roundups, massacres, disappearances or other tactics used by their enemies. Their professional ethos is also reflected in public opinion that lists the Colombian Military as the second most respected institution in the country just behind the Catholic Church.

#### **The Uribe Administration's Progress**

Plan Colombia predates President Uribe by two years and will end coincidentally when he leaves office in 2006. While he has firmly embraced the plan, he has also brought to office new initiatives and a long-term vision that extends well beyond that six-year plan. President Uribe won a landslide victory by running on a platform of aggressively defeating and neutralizing the terrorists in his country while asserting government control of national territory. After years of failed attempts to negotiate with illegal armed groups, to include a bold experiment that gave the FARC a safe haven in the southern part of the country, the people of Colombia had finally had enough of terrorist groups, especially after seeing how the FARC had used their safe haven to plot terrorist acts and establish drug base camps instead of developing their notional politics into a concrete reality.

President Uribe faces enormous challenges, but he is using his mandate to put deeds behind his words. He has been in office for nineteen months, and turning the government from a conciliatory posture to an aggressively focused one has not been an easy task. We need to be steadfast in our support of him now to set the conditions for his longer-term

success. The signs of his progress, which have built upon our support to Plan Colombia, are already becoming evident. Colombia developed a comprehensive national security strategy that directs all the tools at the government's disposal toward a common end of defeating the terrorists. The Colombians now spend nearly 4 percent of their GDP on defense. President Uribe has levied a war tax on the country's wealthiest citizens. He is increasing police end-strength to supplement those already planned for the military. The government has developed a plan to protect travelers along the major roadways. He is pushing the military and the police to gain control of areas and neighborhoods dominated by the narcoterrorists.

The military has had growing operational success against the narcoterrorist organizations across the country, particularly against the mid-level leadership, and all indications are that they will continue to take the fight to the illegal armed groups over the next year. The firm resolve of the Uribe administration, backed by aggressive military operations, has resulted in increased desertions by enemies of the state. These desertions are promising, especially since the government provides a program under which those who leave the FARC voluntarily are put in protected housing and receive health care, education, and work training.

Our Special Forces have trained the staff and soldiers of Colombia's best units, giving these units an added edge of operational effectiveness that is paying dividends. The Colombian Army has established its own Special Operations Command to coordinate and oversee difficult and complex operations against the most sensitive targets. The establishment and training of Commando and Lancero Battalions, modeled on our own Ranger battalions, has given the Colombians a unit that can strike high-value targets

including enemy leadership. The Colombian military is also in the process of establishing a Joint Special Operations Command that will synchronize special operations among all branches of the Colombian military. U.S. Southern Command's special forces component, Special Operations Command South, will provide training to this new unit. Currently, U.S. military forces are conducting deployments in fourteen different locations in Colombia providing training to nine major Colombian military units. Additionally, Planning Assistance Training Teams are assisting the Colombian army's mobile brigades in operational planning. We have also trained the Colombian urban counter-terrorist unit and continue to upgrade their capabilities and equipment.

U.S. Special Forces also trained Colombian Armed Forces in Arauca to protect a portion of the 772-kilometer oil pipeline that had been a frequent target of FARC and ELN attacks. Pipeline attacks are down significantly. This training was just one part of a nationwide Infrastructure Security Strategy that protects critical facilities and reestablishes control in narcoterrorist influenced areas of the country.

We continue to train Colombia's helicopter pilots, providing their forces a growing ability to perform air assaults that are key in the battle against dispersed enemies. We deploy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in country that have provided timely, actionable intelligence to Colombian units. We are training their staffs with Planning Assistance Training Teams that increase their ability to plan and execute intelligence driven operations against illegal armed groups. We are working with Colombian Marines to establish a third Colombian Training Team that will work with units of the Riverine Brigade to increase the operational readiness and proficiency of Colombia's extensive riverine forces. We contracted logistics to help the Colombians

maintain their own C-130 fleet and provided maintenance trainers to improve the operational readiness of their helicopter fleet. Toward that end, we are looking forward to establishing long term solutions to readiness issues with the establishment of a National Maintenance Point for Colombia's helicopters, and a Logistical Automation System that will integrate supply and fiscal management for parts and materials for the Colombian military and National Police. We also are assisting in the training of the Colombian National Police Carabineros (Rural) who have recently established presence throughout the country.

We continue to provide medical training and assistance to the Colombian military to improve their health services support to their combat troops. With our support the Colombian military now has a well-established "Combat Life Saver" training course. Additionally, they have adopted our Forward Surgical Team concepts and doctrine and have moved ahead by establishing four deployable surgical teams.

In civil-military relations, we are helping the Colombians to build a civil-affairs capability that will enhance the communications between the Colombian military and government with the populace in previously ungoverned spaces. In the past year, with our support, the Colombian military has written and adopted a civil affairs doctrine that allows them to minimize the impact of their military operations on the civilian population, while at the same time synchronizing humanitarian assistance with their operations. In the departments of Arauca, Cudinamarca, Caqueta, and Guaviera – portions of the last three are in the former despeje – the Colombian military has provided basic medical care to over 20,000 civilians and rehabilitated a number of educations and medical facilities. In the next six months, they will conduct 39 similar events in

conjunction with other Colombian ministries. In addition, our Civil Affairs forces have worked with the office of the Minister of Defense to develop mechanisms that synchronize the inter-agency planning requirements needed to re-establish governance in previously ungoverned spaces. To this end, the Government of Colombia has established a Coordination Center for Integrated Action. This inter-agency body – consisting of representatives from the office of President Uribe, the ministries of defense, interior, education, and others – develops policies and plans to ensure that as the Colombian military successfully reclaims terrorist controlled areas that the other bodies of government rapidly respond, establish presence, and provide the population with the government services they did not have while under control of the illegally armed groups.

Beyond our coordinated military efforts, President Uribe has sponsored political, economic, and judicial reforms. These measures will assist the Colombian economy as well as free up resources for increased security measures. President Uribe aims to reduce the government bureaucracy, eliminate corruption, and enact fiscal reform. Economically, President Uribe's stance and the promised reforms have buoyed the country's confidence. The government of Colombia has collected 18 percent more taxes compared to last year. Further, tax collection (as a percentage of GDP) rose from 16 percent in 2002 to 19 percent in 2003. Colombia has raised over one billion dollars via bonds since the new administration took office, and its stock market has increased by 50 percent this year. Likewise, President Uribe has sought to stamp out corruption and bolster judicial reform.

This list is just a partial highlight of the coordinated effort the Colombian government is making to solve its own problems. President Uribe has infused his government with

energy, organization, and a sense of purpose. He is getting results now, and will continue to direct all his resources toward making Colombia a safe, prosperous, democratic nation.

Under President Uribe, our country's significant investment in Plan Colombia is beginning to show substantial results. He is fully adhering to Plan Colombia and already looking well beyond it. Most notably a subsidiary campaign plan provides a long-term strategy and has been coordinated across the Colombian services, and the interagency. This campaign plan details the systematic defeat of Colombia's narcoterrorists. He is also building the systems that will eventually return Colombia to the ranks of peaceful and prosperous nations. President Uribe has only two and a half more years in office. Consequently, it is critical – especially this year and next – that he gets our unwavering support to set all his long-term initiatives firmly into place.

#### **Way Ahead**

We are seeing the pendulum swing in Colombia, and we will continue all of our planned training and support as well as seeking new opportunities to increase that support at this critical moment. Colombia is the linchpin in the narcoterrorist battle, but we must be careful not to win the battle in Colombia and lose the war in the region. As the Colombians make progress, their success will push narcoterrorists to seek safer areas in which to operate. Already, the FARC, ELN, and AUC operate across the porous borders of Colombia's neighbors, and the remote nature of many of these areas makes them ever more attractive as safe havens. While we are seeing increased coordination and cooperation among most of Colombia's neighbors, some of those countries also lack the resources to maintain territorial sovereignty in these ungoverned spaces. Thus, across the

Andean Ridge, we are working with the bordering nations to increase cooperation further, fortify borders and strengthen capabilities.

In an ongoing series of multinational exercises (UNITAS, Amphibious, and Panamax), we are training with the Colombian Navy in a combined operation. In Peru, we continue to sustain their riverine interdiction ability, as well as working with the interagency to support their eradication program and counternarcotics aviation. In Ecuador, we have supported their riverine capability and worked closely with them to complete the essential forward operating location at Manta. We are seeing a welcome acknowledgment of the Colombian border concern by Ecuadorian. In Bolivia, we have worked on their riverine capabilities as well and supported their eradication efforts. Additionally, we have already seen the Brazilians take up active patrolling on their own border with Colombia.

As the lead Department of Defense agent for implementing military aspects of U.S. policy in Colombia, U.S. Southern Command will continue to maintain a priority effort against narcoterrorism. Key in most of our recent endeavors has been approval by the U.S. Congress of Expanded Authority legislation. This legislation has allowed us to use funds available for counterdrug activities to provide assistance to the Government of Colombia for a coordinated campaign against the terrorist activities of its illegal armed groups. The granting of Expanded Authority was an important recognition that no meaningful distinction can be made between the terrorists and drug traffickers in our region. The country's two largest terrorist groups – the FARC and AUC – are deep into the narcotics business; the smaller ELN also participates to an extent. Trying to decide whether a mission against a FARC unit was a counterdrug or counterterrorist one was an

exercise in futility and hampered operational effectiveness on the ground. Expanded Authority has eliminated the time consuming step of first evaluating the mission based on its probable funding source and now allows us to bring to bear all our assets more rapidly. As just one example, it will allow assets controlled by Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) to continue being used to their full potential to provide real-time, actionable intelligence that is key in conducting effective operations against the narcoterrorists. Additionally, JIATF-S will take an increased role in counter-illicit trafficking, as many materials other than narcotics use the same transit routes through our area of responsibility. Expanded Authority for Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006 coupled with increasing the personnel CAP are the single most important factors for us to continue building success in Colombia. While our efforts are, for good reason, Colombia-centric, we are not letting others fall behind to become the next targets for terrorist groups. The cooperative counter narcoterrorist groundwork we are laying today will further our national security for decades to come.

### **Conclusion**

We are at a critical time in Colombia's history. The elected government of President Uribe enjoys unparalleled approval ratings over 75 percent. Under his leadership, the military and police are helping to regain control of areas long held by narcoterrorists. Colombia's citizens are taking a more active role in their nation's defense and providing actionable intelligence to the Colombian Armed Forces. There is a renewed sense of momentum, commitment, and hope as the Colombian people struggle to save their country, but there is also a finite window of opportunity beyond which public opinion and support will wane without significant progress.

We are optimistic about the progress we are seeing in Colombia, though there remains an enormous amount of work to be done. We are at a critical point where the progress in eliminating conflict, reducing tension, and establishing democracy throughout the region could be at risk if we are not steadfast in our efforts. While our attention is drawn to another region of the world, we must keep in mind that we live in this hemisphere, and its continued progress as a region of democracy and prosperity is paramount to our national security.

I would like to thank the Chairman, Ranking Member and the Members of the Subcommittee for this opportunity and for your continued support. The men and women of the United States Southern Command are working to their utmost to accomplish their missions for our great country.

Mr. SOUDER. I want to thank each of you, and directly through you, to thank the men and women in our armed forces who are assisting us in these efforts. We very much appreciate the successes we have seen in Colombia. In fact, Colombia, in many ways, is a model for what we would hope would happen in Iraq; that as we move in the development of a stable nation and a democracy there, that our forces would, if anything, be supplemental, supporting local police and military forces that we supply our allies, rather than having to fight the battles for freedom. And in Colombia, unlike what we saw in Vietnam in many cases, or in Iraq right now, they are actually on the front lines fighting and dying because of our narcotics use, and it is our brave men and women providing the assistance and technical training to do that, and it is a model really of how it should work, and it is why we are at least seemingly turning the corner in Colombia.

General MIXON. Sir, if I can make a comment on that. In my visits down there, and I average about once a month going to Colombia to work with their military, it is clear to me that their military and their civilian administration does not want the United States to pursue this fight. They appreciate the assistance, they need the assistance and the expertise that we bring to the battlefield, but they understand this is their fight to win, and they want to be the ones that win the fight, and not have U.S. forces doing the fighting for them.

Mr. SOUDER. I am going to ask unanimous consent to insert into the record an unclassified statement from Major General John Sattler, U.S. Marine Corps, Director of Operations U.S. Central Command. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The prepared statement of General Sattler follows:]

UNCLASSIFIED

STATEMENT OF

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN SATTLER, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS

US CENTRAL COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

ON US CENTRAL COMMAND'S COUNTER NARCOTICS PROGRAM

21 APRIL 2004

UNCLASSIFIED

Chairman Souder, Congressman Cummings, distinguished members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss illegal narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan, its relation to narco-terrorism, and the programs we are developing to help counter this problem in collaboration with other agencies and governments. We appreciate Congress' support of the DoD counter-narcotics program in last year's supplemental appropriations bill, particularly in regard to our efforts related to Afghanistan.

As you know, U. S. Central Command is currently focused on defeating transnational terrorism and creating secure and stable environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the broader CENTCOM area of responsibility encompasses the geographic and ideological heart of the global war on terror, a war without borders that spans all twenty-five countries in the region. The overt war on terror began in Afghanistan and a stable, democratic, economically viable state there will provide an alternative to the terrorist vision of a future characterized by oppression and prolonged conflict.

The narcotics problem in Afghanistan presents a special challenge. The international community and Afghan leadership, with the support of the United States and other Coalition allies, are addressing this challenge. The United Kingdom has the international lead in Afghanistan and with key Afghan leaders, including President Karzai and Minister of Interior Jalali, are beginning to take action against the narcotics trade. This problem requires a comprehensive, sustained effort championed by the Afghan government. Technical help and resources from the United Kingdom, United States and the international community will greatly enhance the Afghan government's effectiveness in combating this destructive trade.

The U.S. Central Command counter-narcotics program for Afghanistan and the surrounding Central Asian States is being developed in coordination with the State Department's efforts to improve law enforcement in Afghanistan and compliment the programs developed by the United Kingdom. In the short term, we will focus our efforts on direct assistance to the Afghan government that establishes a more effective counter-narcotics capability.

Central Command will focus the \$73 million dollars made available in the FY 2004 Supplemental for Afghanistan's counter- narcoterrorism program to disrupt the illicit drug trafficking that supports terrorist elements in Afghanistan. These groups include Taliban remnants, Al Qa'ida operatives and leaders, other extremist elements like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-I-Islami, as well as Afghan criminal gangs and transnational criminal elements.

The supplemental funding that Congress has approved will assist Coalition, host nation, contractor and other governmental agencies to:

- Monitor traditional overland smuggling routes from Afghanistan to the bordering nations through the construction of border control checkpoints and the employment of sensor technology.
- Equip Afghan counter-narcotics units and law enforcement agencies to conduct interdiction operations against narcotraffickers.
- Provide Afghanistan with the communications connectivity necessary to rapidly respond to narcoterrorist threats with synchronized interagency operations.
- Establish an interagency counter-narcotics intelligence fusion center to gather, collect, process and disseminate information leading to actionable intelligence. This will enhance operations by U.S. law enforcement officers, Provincial Reconstruction Team law enforcement

liaison cells, Coalition forces, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Crimes and Narcotics Center, United Kingdom law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and other governmental agencies represented in the region.

- Conduct an Afghan counter-narcoterrorism public awareness program in concert with the Department of State that helps the Afghan interior ministry develop a public affairs capability.
- Provide equipment and other support in concert with United Kingdom operations against narcoterrorist activities in Afghanistan.
- Conduct Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) and monitor vessels suspected of transporting narcotics and/or terrorists based on actionable intelligence.

U.S. CENTCOM views narcotrafficking as a significant obstacle to the political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. The revenue generated from poppy cultivation provides resources for extremists and the smuggling infrastructure that supports narcotics trafficking facilitates terrorist transportation and logistics. Local terrorist and criminal leaders have a vested interest in using the profits from narcotics to oppose the central government and undermine the security and stability of Afghanistan. As a result, the DoD counter-narcotics program in Afghanistan is a key element of our campaign against terrorism.

As important as our contribution to the DoD counter-narcotics program is, the underlying causes for the growth of narcotrafficking must be addressed. Farmers are hard pressed to cultivate cash crops that can provide revenue for their families and villages. Poppies are

notoriously easy to grow, and their market value makes it difficult for legitimate crops to compete. Additionally, narcoterrorists prey upon farmers who do not produce, contributing to a lack of confidence at the local level in the capability of the central government to provide adequate security. We must not only target poppy production and trafficking, we must also implement holistic initiatives that enhance the economy and agriculture to provide alternatives to the opium growers if we are to be ultimately successful in eliminating narcotics proliferation in Afghanistan and the region.

Thank you for the opportunity to share Central Command's strategy, objectives and plans.

Mr. SOUDER. We are disappointed that CENTCOM couldn't be here today, and I want to start this part of the questioning with some questions to Mr. O'Connell regarding Afghanistan.

We recently held a hearing where we called in the Department of State because our understanding was that we are on the verge of the largest production of heroin that has ever come out of Afghanistan. If this occurs on our watch, and we understand that Britain has the primary responsibility for eradication, it would be a shame. One of the things that came forth at that hearing was a memo and guidelines. But first I want to know, from the best you can say, how many labs and warehouses with heroin have been destroyed in Afghanistan, and where and when have we been aggressively pursuing that?

The eradication is under Britain, and that is what we covered in our last hearing. Much of this gets stockpiled and is in different places, and we at times know where it is, and the question is what are we doing about it.

Mr. O'CONNELL. Thank you, Chairman Souder, for your question. It is not an easy one to answer with any great accuracy, but I can tell you that we have recently queried U.S. Central Command, and I do regret also that Central Command could not be represented. General Sattler could not be released from theater, and his deputy has a seriously ill father, but they had every intention to appear and have in fact appeared before.

I have met with General Sattler and, in fact, received responses last night specifically to a listing of which labs have been hit, on what date, and what amounts have been confiscated to date. They go back into the early March timeframe, so that is all the information I have insight into. I will tell you that some of these lab attacks have been extremely successful. The problem I have is that they have classified their list of successes, and I would be happy to provide that to the committee in either a closed session or through the appropriate security procedures.

But we do have a procedure that has now been placed in CENTCOM that has specific requirements for CENTCOM forces that requires them to do certain things during discovery of drugs during normal operations. As you know, we are not involved in the eradication. They have a policy now where the DEA will be notified, certain intelligence fusion centers will be alerted, drug caches over 10 kilograms will kick into action several activities by the intelligence fusion center there, the DEA and UK forces, and they are encouraged and have specific procedures to follow when encountering drugs and drug labs.

And I think I need to leave it there, again due to the classification of the response from CENTCOM, but I would be happy to provide that to you, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. I appreciate that. And we will look for such a closed session. Let me ask a brief question, because I want to do two followup questions with this.

Do we classify in Colombia where we have blown up storehouses or warehouses, or is that information that is available in a public forum?

Mr. O'CONNELL. Sir, there are certain portions of that information that we do in fact classify, simply to protect where those loca-

tions were and where future operations might be conducted. We do have unclassified versions of those briefings that we do present to folks that come through U.S. Southern Command that have an interest in drug interdiction, but to answer your question, we generally do classify those, at least initially.

Mr. SOUDER. Even if the operation is complete?

Mr. O'CONNELL. To my knowledge, that is correct.

Mr. SOUDER. Because there is not one of us that doesn't understand the continuing operations problem. I have reserve forces front deployed in Afghanistan from my home district, a whole unit. I have just had more come back, people from my own church, who were based there and are commanders, and I have no desire to put anybody at risk. And I understand it is politically difficult, but this is a different type of battle than Colombia. At the same time, it is very hard for us to do oversight and to make arguments. We can see information, but some of this information would seem to be public. Yes, it is politically sensitive when you attack these different labs or destroy different areas, but so is it in Colombia politically sensitive, because when we go in and remove a lab area or move in, it creates farmers who are displaced, it creates people who are displaced, and causes political problems for governments that are supportive. And this is a fine balance and we are trying to respect that balance. At the same time, we are concerned and will look at the classified as to what our policies exactly are here, and if in the classified briefing we are not feeling that there is an aggressiveness with it, we will back in a public forum to try to figure out how to balance the continuing operations in what is perceived right now, at least in the pass, a lack of aggressiveness on these issues.

Now, first off, we are very pleased to hear that there have been some, and that is why I say we will do this in a classified setting. But in your testimony, Mr. O'Connell, you stated that terrorist groups such as the Taliban and other extremist groups in Afghanistan support their operations with drug money. By operations, do you mean buying weapons to kill American soldiers? And how else would they be financed other than narcotics? It is not by bake sales. In other words, part of our argument is, look, obviously this heroin is part of the war. And you seem to agree with that in your statement.

Mr. O'CONNELL. I do, Chairman Souder. The one thing I would like to indicate in terms of the Central Command data, you are exactly right, if a lab was destroyed, if drugs were seized, there is no reason that should be classified. The problem with this information is that in some cases the source or the tip for the actual operation is in fact included in the entire paragraph or the results. We could certainly extract that out, and we will go ahead and do that. As I mentioned, this information was received last night. It is classified in a way that we are not used to in that some paragraphs are classified appropriately, others seem to stamp the whole page, and we will get to the bottom of that and provide you with the data.

Additionally, it will not be difficult to incorporate. In fact, CENTCOM has already incorporated a reporting requirement that will give you the type of data that General Mixon is able to in

SOUTHCOM. So bear with us. I understand the requirement, and we will move toward that.

Mr. SOUDER. And this is tough stuff, and nobody on this committee wants to endanger any sources, or put any of our troops at risk. What we want to make sure, and this is very difficult for the Department of Homeland Security and the military right now, is whether you have multiple missions, and as Ranking Member Cummings has said repeatedly, too, there is narcoterrorism and there are other forms of terrorism, and we have all these priorities as we have said in the statement, and we can't put so much of our focus on one that we neglect the other.

Now, you were about to answer my question. When you say operations, you mean they are buying weapons. If they are supporting their continuing operations, they are buying their weapons and supporting their troops. Is that not true? And is it not integrated with the military battle?

Mr. O'CONNELL. It is true, sir, and it is just a fact of life in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, as people have said before, was made by God for growing poppies. If you take any number of figures with respect to the economic statistics in Afghanistan, there are guesses or estimates anyplace between \$4 and \$14 billion for the total GNP of the country. There are estimates concurrent with that that go to almost 60 percent of the actual cash that is flowing through the economy, legal or illegal, comes from poppy cultivation.

So with that nexus and the Taliban certainly previously involved and certainly current involved, to some estimate, yes, you cannot escape the statement that you just made, that Taliban, al Qaeda and others derive some support from the narcotics trade. To the extent, as you and I have discussed, some of the intelligence estimates are just not as accurate as we would like them to be, but certainly I would concur with your statement.

Mr. SOUDER. And if they would have their largest in record that would come out, because our problem in Afghanistan is not that dissimilar to Iraq; it hasn't exploded, but it is starting to.

Let me say for the record, too, yes, it is true some of this information is coming through last night, but this hearing has been scheduled for months, and we delayed it at one point at the request of the Department of Defense and the military to try to accommodate the questions. Then we sent these questions in advance several weeks ago, only to be told yesterday that the responses were going to be classified. I understand that we don't want to have information get out to compromised sources, but it is not like we suddenly dropped this hearing in the last 48 hours on the Department of Defense.

It is also true that there are other things going on in that region, and we understand and appreciate that, but this is a primary narcotics subcommittee, and we are trying to make sure that this doesn't get lost. Having been on the ground in Afghanistan, I know that, for a fact, there was not as much focus as in my opinion there should have been on the heroin interconnection. Now we see in different parts where some of the warlords who are not necessarily the Taliban, but who have historically helped us to some degree, much like what we see in Iraq, where different subgroups are try-

ing now to clink. They don't want democracy; they want to overthrow democracy.

And in talking to President Karzi, one of his concerns and the reason he is now seeing this interconnection is initially we didn't want to be particularly disruptive of some of these zones where the poppy was growing because we thought, well, maybe these people will go along. Now we are finding out they won't disarm. They shot the interior minister and one of the cabinet ministers in Afghanistan. Where are they getting their weapons from? Some of these people aren't classified as Taliban, and by having a very tight definition here that says, well, how much is Taliban funded, it is also the thugs who don't want democracy there, and they are almost completely funded with the heroin.

And while America is watching over in Iraq, we have a similar problem developing in the outer zones outside of Kabul in Afghanistan, that as they try to figure out how are we going to have a census, how are we going to get a count for people to vote, that if you can't get some semblance of order there and get these groups disarmed who are buying their stuff with heroin, we have to figure out how to get control of their sources of money, as the President has said, not just that. And I appreciate that the military is moving forward, but there is really no difference, in our opinion, between a stash of weapons and a stash of heroin, because they don't have the stash of weapons if they don't have the heroin.

Mr. O'CONNELL. Chairman Souder, you are exactly right, and I take full responsibility for I guess the nonresponse on the CENTCOM questions. I will say that I could have come forward with the CENTCOM information I had 2 weeks ago when I testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the same question; however, this data is heartening to me because it is the first time that we have seen this degree of granularity into what is going on with respect to CENTCOM. And I think they are getting the message. We are doing this together, and soon they will be as good as Southern Command, I hope.

Mr. SOUDER. One last thing. And I apologize that some of this information hasn't been shared with the committee, but some of this we have been getting even late last evening. We got this last night, this new counternarcotics directive. We will insert this into the record. I may have an additional question, but I would now like to yield to the distinguished ranking member. This is the unclassified version of the guidelines for the Department of Defense and CENTCOM on narcotics.

Mr. O'CONNELL. Yes, sir. And the classified version is much more specific and I think you would find moves us in the right direction.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you all for being here. And, Admiral Kunkel, I just want to, first of all, thank you for acknowledging that these drugs, when they hit neighborhoods like mine, are indeed weapons of mass destruction. You couldn't have said anything more brilliant. In Baltimore, where I live, we have 300 murders a year, and I would guess that 90 percent of them have something to do with drugs. These are young black men, for the most part, usually under 20, dead. We have 50 percent of our young men

dropping out of school between the 9th and 12th grades. They then, many of them, go to selling drugs.

I visit our shock trauma unit at the University of Maryland, which is located at downtown Baltimore, one of the best in the world, and there are literally 1,000 to 2,000 young people shot but lives spared only because they have shock trauma, and 95 percent of those had something to do with drugs. I see neighborhoods where property values plummet, where people can buy a house for \$75,000 10 years ago, put \$75,000 in it in renovations, and can't sell it for \$50,000 5 years later because of drugs. And that doesn't even begin to deal with the families that are destroyed, the court costs, the cost for trying to repair lives. It just goes on and on and on. So I really do appreciate your saying that.

I am just wondering, Admiral, what is the greatest challenge to the Joint Interagency Task Force West? What is your biggest challenge?

Admiral KUNKEL. Our biggest challenge at JIATF West?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes.

Admiral KUNKEL. Well, right now our challenge is our move, moving and focusing entirely in the Western Pacific and, of course, getting involved, totally engrossed in the initiatives out in the Western Pacific, Regional Maritime Security Initiative, and working with the Department of State on IAI, Illicit Activities Initiative, putting that together and then targeting the countries, specifically Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, all of which have groups of terrorists involved with a drug connection.

Mr. CUMMINGS. General Mison, I am sorry, I was directing my prior comments to you. I took my glasses off; I guess I need to put them back on. But my comments were to you. And again I thank you, General. General, have the expanded authorities granted to the U.S. forces in Colombia enhanced our effectiveness in fighting the drug trade in Colombia?

General MISON. Yes, sir, absolutely. And I take your initial comments to heart. The effects of drugs in this country poses a significant challenge, and I view it myself as a loss of treasure. These are young people that have potential, and we in the military have capabilities that can interdict and at least stop some of the drug flow coming into this Nation. So we view it at U.S. Southern Command as an appropriate and important Department of Defense mission that we pursue aggressively.

To answer your question specifically, those expanded authorities pertain exactly to the comments that both you and the chairman made. There is a tight nexus between drugs, money, terrorists, and all that activity. So with the expanded authorities, it allowed us to go after those groups, the AUC, the ELN, and the FARC in Colombia specifically, by assisting the Colombian military to take the fight to them to take away their resources, that first being the ability to produce, move, and make money off of cocaine; but at the same time take away and destroy those forces that are protecting those individuals that are growing the coca. And we don't do this alone, we do it in conjunction with the Department of State, which has oversight over the eradication program in Colombia, and we have seen significant success in the eradication effort. So expanded

authorities have in fact enabled us to be more effective against the narcoterrorists.

Mr. CUMMINGS. With regard to cooperation from the Colombian Government, how is that coming?

General MIXON. My view is that the cooperation is very good. They cooperate closely with Department of State in their efforts. The counternarcotics brigades provide security and military operations in the vicinity of the spray operations. In addition to that, they are also intimately involved with their police in doing independent operations against the narcoterrorists and their drug production capabilities. Also, the Colombian Navy has been very, very active along the coast of Colombia in the transient zone, either with operations done with U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy or unilateral operations in pursuing the drug traffic. They fully recognize that they have to take the FARC's and the other enemy forces' ability to fund themselves away in order to win this war against democracy in Colombia.

Mr. CUMMINGS. One of the things that has always concerned this subcommittee is the whole idea that drugs produce so much money. And we have seen it in Mexico and other places, where, because of that money, a lot of times the local law enforcement folk get involved in situations where they are being paid off by some of these major drug producers and, as a result, make it very difficult at times for our forces to be effective, and in many instances put their lives in danger because of information flowing to the wrong people.

Have you seen any of that or much of that, or do you think that is something that does not happen too often now?

General MIXON. There is no question that there are huge sums of money involved in this illicit business, and that certain individuals within the various enforcement agencies of these other countries could in fact be paid off, and I am sure have been paid off. I would be foolish not to believe that. But in my discussions with the DEA in Colombia specifically, they are very careful in how they plan and conduct the operations in conjunction with the police and who gets information. In other words, they protect the information. As a result of that, they have had better success over the last year to 18 months in the destruction of labs and the interdiction of these drugs.

The narcoterrorists in this region are well financed and well funded. They have the latest in equipment, global positioning systems, satellite telephones, go-fast boats that can just about outrun any other boat on the commercial market, and when these boats make their way across the Pacific and the Caribbean, if they simply make it to the in-state, they simply destroy the boat and move the cocaine over. An organization that can do that has a lot of money, so they can buy influence and protection.

But I think we are making progress in Colombia. We need to make better progress in Central America, and one way we can do that is by building those institutions of democracy within those nations to include the police force.

Mr. CUMMINGS. How is that coming, your last statement? Do you see strong police force, strong enforcement agencies?

General MIXON. I do within Colombia for sure. I do not have as good a feel for the other nations of the specifics, but I believe they

are making progress. And certainly it is the focus of every one of our agencies at work within those countries. Working with the police forces and so forth is sort of on the edge of what we do in the U.S. military, but my indications are that they are improving. A long way to go, though, for sure.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you find a similar situation, Admiral?

Admiral KUNKEL. Yes, sir. In fact, we have been working with the Thais for at least the last 5 years. At a very low level corruption is pervasive. And not only in Thailand, especially in the Philippines. Our activities in the Philippines, I would say of the lower levels we have to be very careful how we approach the law enforcement agencies. However, I would say this, and I seem to spend more and more time in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia than I care to, but the higher levels, with the authorities they have, I am talking about the law enforcement, and especially the Philippine DEA, recently established, the people that I have met are very committed and dedicated to eradicating the drug problem, because they certainly see connection to the Abu Sayyaf, the terrorist organizations in their country, which affects their national security, which in turn concerns the United States, of course. So they are committed to working with us and receiving our training to fight the narcoterrorists.

Our efforts, I believe, are paying benefits. We are hoping to establish Coast Guard-like authorities in these nations. Their ability to counter the threat, especially from the sea, is very limited. They have no common operating picture. They look to us for advice and training, and we are looking to assist them as necessary.

I only mentioned two countries there, the Philippines and Thailand, but we are doing the same efforts in Cambodia and Indonesia, especially. However, those are long, long journeys, and it will take time. And we are just now beginning to get into the Philippines, which I see, and according to Admiral Fargo, anyway, we are looking for a 20-year plan. This is not an easy road.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just have one more question, but, Mr. Chairman, I am just curious. I heard your comments to the Assistant Secretary. Do you plan to bring the Assistant Secretary back at some other time?

Mr. SOUDER. What our intention is, is to work with some sort of a classified briefing to see what kind of information we get on the classified briefing. And then if that is sufficient, we won't have another hearing; but if need be, CENTCOM and the Assistant Secretary would come in for another hearing.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Well, then I have just have one other question of the two military gentlemen.

We in the Congress are always trying to figure out how we make sure that the taxpayers' dollars are spent effectively and efficiently, and that is one thing I think we all agree on. And at the same time, we try to figure out is there something that you need from us that would help you to be more effective and efficient in what you do. Do you feel like you are getting the support you need and the authority you need to accomplish what you are trying to accomplish? General?

General MIXON. Yes, sir. There is, of course, nobody in the military or other places who would not like to have more resources.

But having said that, we live in a real world and we have a global threat that we are dealing with. So I believe that the amount of funding that we have been provided, for U.S. Southern Command, for the mission is appropriate, and we are making good use of the taxpayers' money.

We are working closely with DOD as they reposition assets that have been involved in the global war on terrorism in other regions, to provide those assets to us so that we can prosecute the end game more effectively against the narcoterrorists as they move drugs up both the Caribbean and the Pacific. That is an asset that DOD will work out with us.

But we appreciate the money that has been provided to us, and we believe it is adequate. Most importantly, the expanded authorities that Congress has granted have been key in the successes that have been achieved. Those expanded authorities, along with the authority, when approved, to increase the cap to an additional 400, will put us in good shape, I think, to continue to pursue the war on drugs in Colombia.

And I emphasized the word authority as it pertains to the cap. We certainly do not foresee immediately advancing the numbers of U.S. military in Colombia to the requested authority of 800. We went forward with a number of 400 so that in the eventuality we foresee additional support to the Colombians under the existing ROE, that we would have that flexibility and would not have to continue to come back to the Congress incrementally and ask for numbers.

In the best of circumstances, if we were to supply the maximum amount of support to the Colombians, that expanded authority number would only go to 723, anyway. At the present time we are slightly below 300 U.S. military in the country. Expanded authority, the additional cap, adequate money, all of those things, we believe we have the resources available to do our mission.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Admiral.

Admiral KUNKEL. Thank you. That was a question I was not really anticipating, but in our focus coming out to the Western Pacific, we found that Admiral Fargo has looked to JIATF West because of what we bring to the fight; it is a joint work all services, interagency, of course, the law enforcement, and we are trying to put in place a model like that into these countries. So as we go into the countries, working with their law enforcement agencies, doing some mill-to-mill, but mainly law enforcement agency work, that we find that our business is expanding. And that would be in the future that we may be requesting further fiscal authorities.

But when I talk about fiscal authorities, what I am really talking about here is you use counternarcoterrorism. As the money comes from Congress down to eventually JIATF West, we are looking for detection and monitoring of counterdrug flow, and how do you use that money to do your mission. And when you are looking to build intelligence fusion centers, for instance, in the Philippines and Indonesia, Thailand, you know, we are doing brick and mortar work. Some of our drug money is using brick and mortar work applied toward that. And when you talk about the payback to the United States, that measure of effectiveness is not as easy to put on the table as we did in the Eastern Pacific with cocaine flow.

But our measure is just as important in fighting the global war. If we can combine those countries' intelligence centers, have them work together in these countries, and create a common operating picture so that we know where these drug boats are going and we have the ability to stop them, the partner nation or the United States can stop them and keep the drugs eventually from coming to the United States, that is what we are about. So we need to, I guess, clarify those lines of authority.

Congress, of course, gives us the money and we look at it—I should say some of us in Pacific Command look at it you can only spend it on drugs. Well, it is more than drugs. It is about counternarcoterrorism. It is not just drugs. And sometimes we look down that soda straw saying it is only drugs. Well, it is not. It is money laundering, as the general said. It is a weapons trafficking. Certainly it is drugs, and it feeds them all. We need those expanded authorities. That would say to JIATF West that would be the key.

I wouldn't want to come back here and have to testify and say I spend my money on brick and mortar, and someone tell me what about drugs, and then try to explain that nexus, because it is certainly there.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Thank you all very much.

Mr. SOUDER. Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your calling this hearing.

Gentlemen, the stakes have been raised tremendously in your work. The stakes were already very high with the work you were doing, simply to keep narcotics from flowing into this country and flowing worldwide. Now with a focus on narcoterrorism, the stakes are higher than anyone could have anticipated just a few years ago. Now, we have terrorists who can get us both ways: they can get funds for their own operations and they can import poison into our country to debilitate mostly young people. You have really got us at both ends now; you are financing your own operations and you are debilitating the population through drugs. That must be a lovely set of conditions for them.

Mr. Cummings spoke about the effects in his own community. The effects are nationwide. Kids in suburban affluent communities look like they are as much in love with drugs as desperate kids who are into drugs for money, and in the inner cities of the United States there is no economy. The grandfathers and the fathers of these young men that Mr. Cummings spoke about had manufacturing jobs. Well, particularly their cities are without jobs. Men without jobs will create their own economy, and the economy in many of our inner cities is a drug economy, a gun economy, and they are killing the inner cities of the United States. They have murdered the African-American family. The mandatory minimums that come out of the drug wars are largely responsible for the fact that 70 percent of Black children are born to never-married women, and men without jobs, of course, do not raise families, they do not father children that they own. It is an absolute catastrophe in the inner cities of the African-American communities.

It is difficult to know how much the Taliban and other terrorist forces are funded through the narcotics trade, I understand that.

But we in this country, with our own efforts since September 11, and I want to commend the administration for the efforts it has taken to close off the usual bank and other monetary transfers. For example, in this city Riggs Bank, a very distinguished bank, now is on the carpet because of its relationship with Saudi Arabia, which of course it has had for decades. But finally there is a crack-down on just letting the Saudis do with money whatever they want to do, because we don't know where in the world that money gets.

But as we close off the usual funnels for money, does this not make drugs perhaps the most commodity available for terrorists today, given the high demand for drugs, particularly in advanced societies? If you want to get money for terrorism, I am asking, isn't the best target the drug trade?

Mr. O'CONNELL. Ms. Norton, was that question directed at me?

Ms. NORTON. I think all of you are qualified to answer the question.

Mr. O'CONNELL. OK. Let me commend you on your statement. I don't know if you were here to listen to the opening statements of both the chairman and Representative Cummings, but yours was equally as excellent and as prescient about how critical this problem is to our Nation.

You can talk about the tragedy that is taking place in the inner city and even in suburban locations. I had occasion, prior to taking this job, to do work in North Dakota and noticed the tremendous problems they are having there with crystal meth, a whole new difficulty that the country has not faced before. But there are faces and real people on the other end of this war, the brave men and women, as an example, in U.S. Southern Command, that are in the jungles in Colombia that have gone to extraordinary lengths to train the Colombian forces so that they can be effective against the traffickers and against the terrorists; the young Coast Guardsmen who are out in extremely dangerous conditions, my son included, to try to do the best they can and interdict this flow that comes to our shores. It is nearly an impossible task, and very frustrating.

And for me as a public servant, to listen to you, and I understand, having lived in this area for a long time, the misery that the District and Baltimore and other places go through. It is a tremendous scourge on our society. I don't know the answer, I am not a social scientist, but my heart goes out to you. I feel proud that the Department, I think, is turning the corner and will make a much more concerted effort to look at how we can actually play as full team members, use our resources wisely, and get at this effort.

Ms. NORTON. I am on the Homeland Security Committee as well, and I appreciate very much the needle in the haystack problem that we have given to all of those who are involved in your work and your efforts, but what I am trying to get at is focus. The focus was, I think, legitimately on closing off the usual funnels of money. And I think we have begun to do that, and that is why I pointed to Riggs Bank. And I am wondering now whether the focus, if we are interested in funding alone. Let us just look at the question of funding of terrorism, shouldn't it be on narcotics.

Mr. O'CONNELL. I think you are exactly right, ma'am, a large portion of it should be. Is our intelligence into those transactions as good as it should be? Probably not. On the Islamic side, I am

sure you are aware of the HAWALAs, the secret transfer that takes place in certain parts of Islamic society, which makes it extremely difficult to track these essentially credit schemes that are done with a wink and a nod and really done by tradition. We are making some progress there.

As you know, there are assets of the Department of Defense that have been directed to work this particular issue. Certainly NSA has been extremely successful. We have had good success working with the CIA's crime and narcotics centers. We work closely with DEA. So as we move forward, are certainly recognize, in fact the Secretary of Defense has specifically asked me to look at those things that we are currently doing, what can we do more effectively on that side; and we have given him answers back. We are participating. We have to be careful about the legal restrictions imposed on the Department of Defense. But you are exactly right, and I am pleased at the direction we are moving; I think it is the direction you are urging us to move, ma'am.

Ms. NORTON. I think we are going to be more and more dependent on the work you do. I don't see why terrorists should bother with anything but narcotics these days, given the demand.

I have one more question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

I was very impressed when I was briefed by SOUTHCOM. I was on a congressional delegation to Guantanamo. We stopped in Miami and we were briefed by SOUTHCOM, and I was just astonished at the progress that has been made in Colombia. I remember how controversial Colombia was, and all kinds of concerns about what the military was doing in Colombia. And if ever there was a story of success, it seemed to come out of SOUTHCOM; the expanded authority, to be sure, the coordinated campaign. What was most impressive is somehow how the military is working with, and here is where leadership becomes important, with the leadership in the country and with the new institutions that apparently the country is building from the ground up, the new democratic institutions. So that you see a transformation in the country itself on the ground, which in turn leads to the defeat of the narcotics culture.

This was so impressive. Whenever you see anything impressive like that has come out of a lot of controversy and yet proved itself as successful as our briefing indicated, one cannot help but ask how much of this is transferrable, for example, to Afghanistan, where you similarly have a country that needs to be rebuilt from the ground up in all of its democratic institutions. It took us some time to understand that is where you had to be, you had to be with the political institutions, you had to be with the local institutions on the ground. And now that we are there, and not simply treating this as a military matter, we are seeing, apparently, in Colombia, something that can only be called a success.

Is this something we can expect perhaps to be transferred in other parts of Latin America, but not to Afghanistan? Is this capable of being replicated in Afghanistan, where we are now having such trouble?

Mr. O'CONNELL. I would like to be able to tell you yes, we can take that wonderful work done by U.S. Southern Command, take those principles, and transfer them over there, but I am afraid that is not the case, ma'am. There are many, many differences, some

you are certainly aware of that you learned when you were down in Colombia. And I echo your comments about the wonderful work done by Southern Command, by President Uribe, the Colombian military.

But we face a different set of circumstances. Certainly, in terrain, the type of drugs grown, the nature of the central government, the nature of the surrounding countries and their particular interests, the almost total dependence on narcotics in terms of the economic flow in Afghanistan, some of the religious aspects all tend to argue against being able to transfer those things. But there are certain basic things, such as the work by U.S. Special Forces, the reconstruction teams in Afghanistan that have made a difference. I would like to say yes, but I am afraid in most cases it is not.

The one common denominator is going to be our courage and our skill, and I think our military is up to the task. In the case of Afghanistan, we have a major ally that we are supporting in the case of the UK, who are the lead for counternarcotics in Afghanistan. We also work closely with the Germans as they train the police, with the Italians as they work on the court system, and other countries.

So certainly a different model, but we will do our best. It is an excellent question, not easily understood as to why you just can't take success in one country and transfer it to another.

Ms. NORTON. I appreciate the thoughtfulness of your answer. The last thing we need, particularly as Americans, who perhaps are accused of this as a kind of cookie cutter approach, you know, what works here, let us take it to Iraq, let us take it worldwide. We can't even take our version of democracy worldwide. I would urge you all to look at what in fact is genuinely transferable, though. I certainly believe the whole notion of working with indigenous institutions and political institutions is important. We do have in Afghanistan the kind of leader that you have in Colombia, so at the top you are all right, it is just all that is in between.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thanks. And to reiterate that point, I think in President Karzi and his cabinet, what we don't have is a 200 year democracy like we have in Colombia. What we have as commonality, however, is their narcotics ability to undermine that democracy. We don't have as much economic diversity as Colombia has. But Afghanistan has had periods in time where they haven't had narcotics dependency, and it is how to get them weaned, and not let them get hooked on heroin again, so to speak.

I have a series of questions that are very important for this hearing to get into the record. I am not going to get through all these. We will have some written followup questions to build this, but let me approach a couple. I often say if you are not ADD when you become a Congressman, you are one after you are done. So even in this sphere I am going to be covering a number of types of questions, but they are things that we have been working on in this community and they are very important to the narcotics efforts.

First let me sort through a little bit of the JIATF changes. As I understand, JIATF West moving to Hawaii from Alameda in northern California, that there has also been some changes in

transfer of how the zone of the eastern Pacific will be handled. Could you explain that briefly?

Admiral KUNKEL. Yes, sir. It is pretty complicated even to explain, but—

Mr. SOUDER. The bottom line is the area around Mexico and California are going to be still under JIATF West or will that be—

Admiral KUNKEL. No, sir. The bottom line is that in the past it was basically the eastern Pacific was divided along the 92 longitude; anything east of 92 was JIATF South, anything to the west of 92 was JIATF West. And it was an agreement between USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM that that 92 line would basically disappear, and at that point JIATF South would have the entire vector coming from south to north into the United States ceded to them. And then, of course, NORTHCOM plays as far as their AOR and the unified command plan. So JIATF West is basically now focused entirely to the west; JIATF South has all of the cocaine flow coming from south.

Mr. SOUDER. So we won't have the problem of a boat coming off Colombia and how the pass-off is going to come when they go out and get something in the eastern Pacific, whether they land in Mexico or California.

How will it work west to east? Now if heroin is coming across, you have them in Hawaii. Where does the transshipment point pass-off occur going from JIATF West to JIATF South?

Admiral KUNKEL. It is now delineated basically 500 miles offshore, to put it bluntly, 500 miles offshore. So my common operating picture, once it is established, coming from Southeast Asia, I am aware of a boat or whatever. If I cannot have interdiction forces in place, detect and monitoring, if I can't get the interdiction forces in place, of course, we pass them off to JIATF South, and that should board JIATF North, if there is one, NORTHCOM, and it should be seamless.

Mr. SOUDER. Now, my understanding is based on the success of what we have seen with JIATF South and West, is that JIATF North is looking at a similar system. Do you know where that stands or what is happening with NORTHCOM?

Admiral KUNKEL. It is not my lane of the road, so I don't know.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. O'Connell, do you know anything on that?

Mr. O'CONNELL. Yes, sir. We are working with Assistant Secretary McHale, the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense in the Defense Department and General Eberhart as to exactly how that will work. I think part of that equation, sir, is the move of JIATF West, the integration of JTF Bravo and their efforts. Any changes in the unified command plan will certainly come into that, and that is currently under discussion. We will certainly, to the extent that we are intimately involved with JIATF South and JIATF West, will do everything we can to facilitate General Eberhart's decision, and Secretary McHale and Secretary Rumsfeld as to whether or not JIATF North is stood up, where it is, and what specifically its responsibilities are, because it will overlap with some of the Homeland Defense responsibilities of U.S. Northern Command.

As you know, sir, the Defense Department is charged to use its C4I networks to conduct our monitoring and detection, and, again,

that is out of my lane but in my area of familiarity, and we will do everything we can do make sure that effort by Northern Command and by the Department is as seamless as it can possibly be.

Mr. SOUDER. Admiral Kunkel mentioned Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand in particular. If it comes north, through Korea or Japan or Russia, and up over the top to Alaska or toward Seattle, who will be watching? Is that what NORTHCOM would stand up? Are you currently watching that zone if it is transiting through the ocean or by air over the top of the ocean?

Admiral KUNKEL. Mr. Chairman, in fiscal year 2003 we were directed by DASDE to establish a technical analysis team in Japan, which JIATF West has stood up, along with the DIA, to start focusing our collection efforts toward North Korea, and working with the Japanese, especially the Japanese Coast Guard. We are there now, we are starting those efforts, but I must say we are really taking baby steps at this point. We are aware of that vector going north, and to pass it off to law enforcement agencies, especially the DEA in the United States, or Customs, those two agencies in particular, and then eventually, of course, to NORTHCOM. So JIATF West has it to the west, and as it approaches we pass that off.

Mr. SOUDER. My philosophy, and pretty much the philosophy of those who have been involved in the narcotics efforts for some time, which includes Speaker Hastert and others who have been focused on this, such as Congressman Kolbe Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, get it where we can eradicate, which is predominantly State Department backed up with resources from SOUTHCOM and the training. If you can't get it there, as it starts to move through, get it before it hits our shores. You know, it gets wider and wider, and the intelligence is absolutely critical in this process. Also, just like in Homeland Security Committee, as we work, as you harden one target, they move to a more vulnerable entry point, as I mentioned about Detroit.

Also, it isn't necessarily true that it is always going to be cocaine or heroin, or this HIBC stuff that is coming in. Now we are seeing the crystal meth particularly in the rural areas, but seeing the first signs of it hitting our urban areas, which could become like a crack epidemic, just like that. We held a hearing in Orlando, FL on OxyContin, and oxycodone, which showed we actually have more deaths from overuse of prescription drugs than we do from cocaine and heroin. We are trying to concentrate on that because these big shipments coming in from people who are overproducing it, it is going to be just like variations of tracking cocaine and heroin, but a different type of challenge.

Just like as if you are fighting war, it is clear that men and women in the armed forces will crush anybody who stands up to fight them right now, so the enemy is not fighting regularly. Well, the drug guys are doing similar type of things. Now, part of that, a critical part, is intelligence. And I wanted to ask a couple questions about these TARS and the aerostats. So if I could ask Mr. O'Connell first, because the JIATFs don't work if we don't get the intelligence.

The Tethered Aerostat Radar System is an example of the detection system now run by Department of Defense. The system was originally authorized in 1986 Omnibus Drug Act and was envi-

sioned for 14 unit picket line on the southern approaches. Unfortunately, it was only implemented to a maximum of 12 and has now been withered down to 7, leaving key southern approaches unprotected. In fact, the Defense Department suggested it only benefits from a single balloon located in the Florida Keys.

Why has TARS capability slipped to half of the congressional authorization, and what has been done with the appropriated funds for the other half?

Mr. O'CONNELL. Once again, I wish I can give you a snap, precise answer, Mr. Chairman. As you cited, the program was originally scheduled for, I believe, 14 sites. I think 12 were eventually done; the systems were up and the maintenance and connectivity were there. I believe it was determined that only 8 sites would cover the desired area. That included, I believe, the site in Puerto Rico as well.

Right now there was a cut last year that Congress directed I think of \$6 million to the Tethered Aerostat Program. I will be brutally honest and tell you that we are in the middle of I don't want to say a spat in the Defense Department, but an honest disagreement between U.S. Northern Command, who has one sense of how the tethered aerostats ought to be used and my department and the JIATF South into who should operate those, maintain, and fund those, where do those funding lines go. Should it better go to Department of Homeland Defense? I don't know. I have my opinion, the Department perhaps has a different opinion. But we hope to have a resolution shortly so that we are not sending an internal Defense spat up to the Hill.

So that is about the best I can give you on that, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, let me say that I appreciate the openness and honesty on that answer, because that is not easy for a person in your position to say that. But if it is about to come here, we need to be prepared, and my guess is is that as we improve a porous border on the southwest, which we have no choice of doing if we are really going to have a Department of Homeland Security. It is not that our men and women aren't working hard there, but the fact is if a million illegal immigrants can get through a year, probably some terrorists can, too. As we try to improve that border and the holes in that border in southwest Arizona, some of the other sections of Texas and other places, it becomes apparent that it isn't going to be able to be controlled just by land border system or a high flying system, in that the low-flying planes and other ways of getting in are critical.

Also, we have, in my opinion, without getting too specific, from the land border, if you take the water border looping over to Florida, some questions in there that are very difficult for us to get answers to as far as what is coming in. And if we don't have this aerostat system, we need other questions of what is happening as we track the people, or have a tip coming out of Colombia, or out of Mexico. We need to be able to see them before it hits my hometown.

Mr. O'CONNELL. Sir, I am going to impose on my colleague the Admiral here in a moment, but there are lots of issues here. We have other capabilities which are the relocatable over the horizon radar, which look farther out. As you know, the aerostats generally

look out to approximately 250 miles. If they are at 10,000 feet, they are looking down. So that is one segment of the airspace you certainly want to cover. There are other alternatives in the segment you just talked about. There are always tradeoffs in terms of expense, reliability.

And I would ask the Admiral, since he is not only a skilled aviator, but has worked these issues before, if he would have any comment on that particular segment that you described geographically.

Admiral KUNKEL. Thank you, sir.

I will revert to my Coast Guard, put my Coast Guard hat on, away from the JIATF director. When I flew out-bat missions several years ago, we need that picture, to have that common picture. If you have a radar picture out there, in order to get the interdiction assets to the right spot, it is a needle in a haystack. You know, we have Coast Guard ships and aircraft out there now, and if you don't have an overhead either aircraft platform or have an aerostat or something to give you that picture, it is a needle in the haystack. And I have done that too many times to where you go out on patrol and you find nothing. I have also done it very effectively given the proper resources like an aerostat or an overhead E3 or P3.

Mr. SOUDER. Continuing along this line, we had a big discussion about what to do after we lost Panama, and then compounded by moving out of Roosevelt Roads Air Station in Puerto Rico. The F16 Coronet Nighthawk was supposed to be part of the justification for moving into Curacao in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Apparently it isn't anymore, and it is unclear to us what is being done on Curacao in an interdepartmental narcotics base, because many of the things being based there aren't being used necessarily for surveillance at this point.

Mr. O'Connell, General Mixon, whoever would like to comment on this, I would like to hear what type of aircraft you have there, what do you see replacing the Nighthawk; do we have adequate resources right now, given the changes that are occurring, and a little bit of that evolution.

General MIXON. I am not intimately familiar with the Nighthawk capability other than to say that I have been told that it was not as effective as they thought it would be, and so it was not actually present when I assumed my responsibilities last summer as the J3 U.S. Southern Command. But having said that, we have other assets from all agencies, DOD, BICE, and also foreign militaries that work out of those what used to be called FOLs, now CSLs, Coordinated Security Locations.

We fly approximately 400 sorties of all types out of those three locations and about 1,500 on-station hours. Results from flying from those locations, about 56 metric tons of cocaine and about 3 metric tons of marijuana either seized or disrupted. So those locations meant Curacao and Cumpala have been key to the replacement of that capability out of Howard Air Force Base in Panama.

From the standpoint of assets, I mentioned earlier that what we are looking for now is a reinvigoration of the assets from DOD, P3s, and we expect potentially AWACS to be available this summer, after they have recouped from the global war on terrorism, that will enhance our interdiction effort. Once we put all of the as-

sets together, both an aerial platform for interdiction and a surface ship that has rotary wing aircraft on it, and we tie those together, we call that MPA, our chances of interdiction goes up to about 70 percent.

So the answer to your question specifically, good use out of the CSLs, large numbers of sorties coming out of there, and we believe even more effective use of those once DOD assets are returned to the full drug end game effort.

Mr. SOUDER. So in banking on the return of those assets from the war on terrorism, do we have additional assets coming in to replace the diverted assets over on the war on terrorism, or are you banking that things are calming down in Afghanistan and Iraq?

General MIXON. I didn't mean to imply that things were calming down in those two theaters of operation, because they are out of my area, obviously, but we have seen the return of the AWACS aircraft, they have been refitted over the last year and we do expect the return of that asset this summer. The other assets pertain, the P3 in particular, to the overall life of the aircraft, and the Department of Defense has come up with a plan for the use of those aircraft.

Fortunately, during the interim we have received excellent support from BICE and also from other nations participating in the interdiction effort, and we have been able to at least sustain a good interdiction program, but we believe it will be much better once we see these assets returned. And we also have good commitment from both U.S. agencies involved in drug interdiction and other governments that are involved in that to sustain the effort in our area of responsibility.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, we will continue to follow this up as we have the various meetings, as we visit SOUTHCOM and so on, but I want to put on the record with this hearing, because it may be a while until we get into that again, this committee historically, under the past administration as well as this administration, has expressed its concern about diversion of assets. We understand that there are very critical problems around the world that you have to deal with, but this comes back to why it is so important to have Mr. O'Connell, in his position, to be an advocate inside the Department of Defense to say remember narcotics is part of the mission too. As Ms. Norton said, we don't see this going down, and particularly in the type of narcotics funding terrorism. This idea that we are going to have traditional war fronts, rather than rogue nations or terrorist groups that don't have national boundaries. It is a different type of warfare. If we don't cutoff their funding and their places that you can't do that if you don't get at the narcotics.

We can't constantly have narcotics be number 21 in mission and have the intelligence resources pulled away and then think that we are going to catch the people. At some point Congress has to say, and you have to help take the lead and say look, we don't have enough resources to do your missions. And that part of the focus of this hearing is to call attention to those resource requirements. I have severe doubts that resources are sufficient, even if there is no diversion on domestic soil that needs an AWACS. Assuming that there is no outbreak in North Korea or Indonesia that needs an AWACS, assuming things go reasonably well in Iraq and Af-

ghanistan that we don't need an AWACS, that we will get something back this summer. And the question is at some point we can't always be the junior partner in this. AWACS were diverted in the last administration for an oil spill in Alaska, they were diverted for Bosnia.

This isn't new under the Bush administration. It is a problem of saying look, maybe we don't have enough of these things to help get a dedicated AWACS to the narcotics effort because we have all this money being spent on JIATF, East, West, now maybe North, but if you don't have the data, what in the world are we doing? What if you have gaps in the data and you are trying to follow somebody?

Now, I know everybody is working hard to fill the gaps, but now let me ask another question, along similar lines, but a different type of question. Has anybody requested more oilers? Part of the problem is that if these guys float in the water and out-wait us? I can't even think of the magnitude of the problem in the Pacific, let alone the Caribbean. One question is if we can see them? If we are following, do we have our data to feed into JIATF? OK, now let us say we have the data sources to see them. Do we have enough resources on the water and in the air to do that? And one key element of it is refueling with adequate oilers, both in the East Pacific and in the Caribbean.

General Mixon.

General MIXON. Yes, sir. If I may go back just a moment to the question you made in your earlier comment. Certainly, Mr. O'Connell is our strongest advocate in DOD. Since his arrival there, we have been open and frank in our discussions with him, and he has gone forward numerous times to support our mission. And I am confident in telling you today that if in fact we see a depletion of assets to be a threat to our mission, I am convinced that General Hill will bring it to the attention, to include your own. So I am confident in that.

Mr. SOUDER. Because we are spending over \$1 billion right now in the Andean Region. And if we are spending all that money down in Colombia and it gets out because we didn't put the in-between in, we are wasting a fair share of that.

General MIXON. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'CONNELL. Mr. Chairman, if I could sort of take the heat off General Mixon. We are keenly aware in the Department of the strain on resources, particularly ISR resources. You asked particularly about what we used to call the forward operating location at Curacao. And we have closed Roosevelt Roads. That creates a singular problem in how we used to address the whole surveillance issue in the Caribbean Basin. We have a capability there of 12 aircraft, various mixes, 2 large, 4 medium, 6 small, that all perform counternarcotics missions, either detection monitoring, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance. But this can include a mix of P3s, EP3s. We have Air Force E3s, the AWACS that you just described, KC135 tankers, EC130's, Coast Guard HC130's, Immigration Customs small jets, C12s, and other antisubmarine patrol aircraft. In addition, we are certainly relying on assets from some of our allied nations: U.K., the Dutch, in some cases the French.

It is a difficult mix. I have specifically addressed this with the J3 of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Schwartz. He has carefully looked at our requirements for this summer against what we think will be needed in other theaters. Additionally, the Deputy J3 of the Joint Staff accompanied me to JIATF South, where we met with General Hill, Commandant of the Coast Guard, and looked specifically at how we can maximize our intelligence, surveillance, and recognizance capabilities as a government, as a team, particularly for the summer season.

I am not convinced that we have the maximum solution possible, but I am convinced that with the current constraints we are under, we are doing the best we can. And that is my best call on that one, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

General MISON.

General MISON. Yes, sir. Getting to the specific question about the refueling operations you asked in your second comment, the Navy has supplied refueling ships, they have been made available because there are refueling operations and long legs that the drug traffickers will use. In addition to that, the United Kingdom has apportioned one of its top-of-the-line oilers for the refueling effort, and also we are doing work and have agreements with the Peruvian Navy to also provide oiler capabilities. So we try to get a balance. And I think what is important about this is not only the U.S. effort, but also the effort of the other nations involved in drug interdiction so that they carry a portion of the burden.

So I hope that answers the question on refueling operations that you asked a moment ago.

Mr. SOUDER. Let me raise two more things. We held a hearing in Arizona, and staff has been down that section of Arizona from Tucson west, probably all the way over to Yuma, maybe even El Centro, is one of our more vulnerable segments in the United States because it is so desert: not as many traditional roads, hard to patrol. But the Barry Goldwater Range covers approximately the western third of the land border of Arizona and Mexico. The Range also claims significant land north of the border. This Range is used for air-to-air and air-to-ground testing. As the U.S. Border Patrol has become more effective preventing and intercepting illegal immigration in the buildup areas, more and more human and contraband smuggling has migrated to the austere areas such as the Goldwater Range.

Apparently the DOD agents for the range, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps, have refused to allow Federal law enforcement agencies access to air and land along the border. As a result, we haven't been able to control the illegal immigrants and drugs entering that area as effectively as others. We held a hearing in Arizona, as I mentioned. Some of the DHS witnesses testified at the magnitude of the smuggling problem and how critical access to the border area is. They also informed me about a phenomenal number of people who die in this area from exposure.

I understand briefly from our discussion, Mr. O'Connell, that there has been some negotiation and movement, but up until now the Luke Air Force Base and the Pentagon refuse to promulgate a memorandum of understanding between DOD and DHS for law en-

forcement access to the Range in the immediate area of the border, for example, allowing a fly zone for the planes that we move along the border, which, by the way, our fighter jets aren't supposed to be down in that section anyway. Are you prepared to take responsibility at the Department of Defense if you don't allow us to go after the flow across the border? In other words, is it going to be farther into the Range before there is some sort of a way to do the intercept?

Mr. O'CONNELL. I thank you for your question, sir. I was alerted last night by members of my staff that this was an issue, and in terms of the research that I have been able to do, we did check with Northern Command, we checked with JTF6, the operational alliance in El Paso, we checked with the Border Patrol office in Yuma, and we asked to speak to both Air Force and Marine Corps representatives and asked specifically has there been any refusal to allow Federal law enforcement on the Range, or are there any specific restrictions. With the exception of a minor safety belt that I am not specifically familiar with in terms of the depth, the people in Yuma say that there is now not a problem, that there is cooperation.

I certainly am sensitive how you, as a representative, would be very upset if this were the case. I can only tell you that my limited investigation has indicated that if there was a problem, it is solved. And if that is not the case, I will personally get back to you. But that is the best information that I have at this time.

Mr. SOUDER. Part of the problem in that area is there aren't roads, so there is a minimal way to get there, even in the area where Organ Pipe National Monument is, where we had the ranger killed and where they had to shut down the third best hiking trail in that whole region because so many drug runners are going through the park. That area is comparatively developed, compared to over where we practice bombing, as it should be. The problem is, as we seal these areas, we are not only going to have the drug smugglers moving over to where there is no resistance, they are going to be walking in the middle of the bombing range, and all of a sudden we are going to have public hearings about whether we are, in our testing, hitting illegal immigrants, who will be portrayed in the most sympathetic ways, not as narcotraffickers. And one way to do this is to have, like the rest of the border, a fly zone where we can put the ICE planes to be able to track that, because I know the military wants a flexibility maximum, but this is an international border. They can't come up that close to the border, anyway, without risking international law violations.

Obviously, we don't want to have our own planes colliding. We don't want to have our drug enforcement and immigration people running around and restricting our ability in one of the premier places with which to train our military personnel. But you can't have a border with gaps in it. We are having similar problems with the National Park Service, with the Fish and Wildlife Service in parts of this, because if we harden one target, they are going to move to the softer target. And if you will look at this and continue to work so that we can make it a continued thing. I know there have been discussions, but we have to get some kind of resolution. I know the Arizona delegation is really nervous about this issue.

Mr. O'CONNELL. Yes, sir. If you would allow me to take that as a question, I promise Mr. Newbury of my staff will be back to you and your staff on what specifically we know, what things we can do. I share your concern, and we have it for action.

Mr. SOUDER. And I want to thank all of you. We will probably have some additional written questions, and, as you know, we have an interactive relationship, and try to both get staff and members to each of your JIATFs and SOUTHCOM because you are so critical.

One thing I want to add for Mr. O'Connell is one of our concerns, and you can hear the frustration here. It is a kind of a battle that has to be continued, especially with all the challenges that you have, that in the White House National Drug Control Strategy it mentioned DOD twice on counternarcotics, on page 31 and 51. Yet you have one-twelfth of the counternarcotics budget and you have 174 percent of the budget in counternarcotics that ONDCP has to do the national ad campaign, to do all the HIDTAs, to do all that side of the stuff. You are a major player in counternarcotics, and we need that acknowledgment out of the Department of Defense and out of the White House of how major a player it is.

And I have one question I didn't get asked that we definitely will put forth, but it has so many parts to it. In my area I don't have an active base, but I have tons of Guard and Reserve, and National Guard has been doing lots of missions in drug support and other types of things, and as we increasingly use our Guard and Reserve like they are regular military—I mean, I have one Guard unit deployed in Iraq, 750 people for 15 months. I have a Reserve unit going over right now to Afghanistan that hasn't been deployed since Leyte Gulf, and they are going to be gone for over a year. Most of these people had other jobs, they were doing partial support of other things, and part of the thing is how is that impacting the narcotics area. I don't think these things are fully thought through as a national strategy, that, oh, this is how we were using them over here because we see this crisis over here, and we just need to make sure that narcotics is at the table. JTF6 in El Paso has historically done a military training mission, and it is a great way for Guard-Reserve units to be trained all over the country, but while they are training, they are doing narcotics missions and border missions, so it's a twofer: we are training and fighting narcotics. And to make sure that that stays in the mix. We are banking on you in your position.

Also, if you can help us with the Secretary of Defense Office and Legislative Affairs to make it a priority that we can work with CENTCOM here on the narcotics efforts. It is a major concern of this committee, myself and the ranking member and the other members of this committee, that the heroin boost out of Afghanistan does not come on our watch, and that, second, we don't believe that we can stabilize Afghanistan unless we are aggressively understanding that the heroin is interrelated with the subgroups in Afghanistan. And it is not just the Taliban, it is any group that wants to challenge the authority of a democratic institution, including crooks on the street, regional thugs, anybody that is inter-related.

We look forward to getting the classified briefings. But the one thing you are hearing about the 9/11 Commission, which I voted against and do not support, at the same time, what the American people are hearing is that we don't preplan enough. In Afghanistan, we can see this coming. It is absolutely happening on the ground. The focus right now is on Iraq, but they are farther along in some ways in democracy in Afghanistan, but it, in many ways, is an even tougher country than Iraq. They don't have oil, they have narcotics. Heroin is their oil. And that whole region of this country, we were depending on the good faith of regional sublords to dominate, and they aren't cooperating all of a sudden, they are fighting Karzai. You have religious and ethnic divisions in Afghanistan that are just as tough, if not tougher, than we have in Iraq, and all of a sudden, if the attention turns back over there and they say to us in Congress, where were you? How did these people get these guns? How did these people get this set up? How come we have these armed insurgents here who are attacking and killing our men and women from back home, and we say, well, they get their money from heroin. Well, what were you doing when they produced the crop? What were you doing when you had them in their warehouses and you didn't hit them? That has to be made clear to our military.

I believe there has been tremendous progress. In the last stretch here we need to accelerate that process. I know that the State Department is focused, DEA is on the ground now. It isn't just a military question. You can't do it all, the Brits need to be focused more on it, and we put a little pressure on them as well. And we will continue to work with you, but we are really banking on you to help us with some of that too inside the Department of Defense.

Mr. O'CONNELL. I feel the responsibility, believe me.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you all for coming, and thank you for your leadership. We very much appreciate it. The job of an oversight hearing is to try to identify some of the gaps, but we are really trying to help you make sure you have adequate resources in the areas of your responsibility and will continue to do so.

With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,  
AND HUMAN RESOURCES**

**DoD COUNTERNARCOTICS: WHAT IS CONGRESS GETTING  
FOR ITS MONEY?**

**April 21, 2004**

**QUESTIONS FOR THOMAS O'CONNELL**

- 1. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics falls under your command on the Department's organizational chart. Therefore, the performance of the critically important counternarcotics missions and the oversight of the Deputy and the Central Transfer Account are your responsibility.**

- a. What is the status of filling the current Deputy Assistant Secretary vacancy?**

The Department has nominated an individual to fill the position and the White House is currently considering our recommendation. In the meantime, we have a very competent management team in place headed by the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bob Newberry.

- b. What oversight and prioritization have you provided to the Deputy and Acting Deputy with respect to the Central Transfer Account?**

I work very closely with the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bob Newberry, in developing our counternarcotics policy and overseeing the execution of the Department's counternarcotics programs. We do this in close coordination with the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the Services and the Defense Agencies. This oversight role has worked well in the past and continues to be effective.

- 2. The Department of Defense has faced significant challenges with respect to resource allocation given conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Can you explain what principles the Department follows in allocating resources among the Combatant Commands specifically as they relate to counternarcotics missions? How much influence do you exert on these decisions?**

You are absolutely correct. The Department is facing significant challenges and has to make difficult funding decisions. That said, the counternarcotics account has been fully supported, albeit any program could generally make productive use of additional funds.

I have the full authority within the Department in the allocation of counternarcotics funds among the combatant commands. Our current priority of effort is clearly in Colombia and Afghanistan.

3. **The Subcommittee staff received briefings that suggested that the level of Department resources that are currently being made available for drug interdiction missions are far below the requirements identified by the U.S. Southern Command.**
- a. How do you account for these low levels of support?**
  - b. Did the Department consider the impact of these resource shortfalls on efforts to combat drug trafficking?**
  - c. Can we ever expect these resources to return to previous levels?**

The Department makes every attempt to have the annual DoD counternarcotics budget request reflect the proper balance between competing priorities. Overall, SOUTHCOM receives over 42% of the Department's total CN budget. That is approximately \$362M in FY05. Compare that to \$17M for CENTCOM, \$20M for PACOM, and \$3M for EUCOM.

4. **The U.S. Southern Command contracted with the Northrop Grumman division “California Microwave” for aerial observation services. Single-engine aircraft and civilian crews were utilized extensively in Colombia, in support of DoD. These single-engine aircraft were not capable of climbing over the Andes in cloudy weather, due to engine performance limitations. One of these aircraft suffered an engine failure over FARC controlled terrain and crash-landed. All occupants survived the crash. An American pilot and a Colombian were executed near the crash site by the FARC. The remaining personnel were taken alive and are being held against their will by the narco-terrorists.**

**a. Who had oversight of the SRS program?**

The aircraft were under the operational control of JIATF-S and the Tactical Assistance Team (TAT). The TAT and Air Command and Control Element (ACCE) had sole responsibility for the control of the platform, flight schedules, where the crew was berthed, where the aircraft was based, etc. Contract oversight was provided by the Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office (CNTPO) at Dahlgren, VA. CNTPO provided contracting services including the contract for development of the platforms to SOUTHCOM requirement specs beginning in May 2000, and contract for aircraft operation, which ended in June 2003.

**b. Why did DoD allow an underpowered aircraft to be flown over hostile terrain?**

The aircraft was not underpowered. This type of aircraft is still used extensively in Colombia. It is a wilderness aircraft designed for unimproved fields, short takeoff/landing, etc. The aircraft utilized in the SRS program is a proven platform/airframe, which has performed well in a wide variety of conditions around the world. The replacement aircraft is a twin engine design based on having an aircraft/airframe that can generate over a maritime environment as well as overland.

**c. What is the current status of efforts to locate and repatriate the American hostages in Colombia?**

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is holding the three American hostages in a very remote area outside the immediate reach of the Colombian military. This region's jungle terrain and mountains make it one of the world's most remote areas.

The focus of our efforts is on locating and assuring the safe return of our three citizens.

We will not take any action to jeopardize the hostage's safe return.

On December 4, 2003, U.S. Ambassador William Wood announced the Rewards for Justice Program, which offers as much as \$5 million to those who provide actionable information leading to the arrest or conviction of the FARC Commanders implicated in the seizure and holding of the hostages. The United States has an additional standing reward offer of approximately \$340,000 and the possibility of a U.S. visa for anyone offering information leading to the successful resolution of this hostage crisis. We are also working closely with the Colombian government to enhance their capacity to fight the related scourge of kidnapping for ransom, one of the financial underpinnings of the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN).

**d. Why weren't these de-facto Southern Command employees covered by the search and rescue plan in that region?**

SAR aircraft were launched as soon as possible after the SRS pilot radioed in his engine failure and reported he was going to execute a forced landing. Given the unfortunate circumstance of his forced landing in full view of a gathering of FARC narco-terrorists it may not have been possible to prevent the murder and kidnapping of crew members, even if SAR aircraft had been overhead as he landed.

- 5. The Subcommittee staff has been informed that refueling capabilities for maritime assets on interdiction missions in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific would be critical assets – in fact the traffickers have such a capability with “mother ships” but our interdiction assets do not.**
- a. Has such support been requested?**
  - b. Is “oiler” support forthcoming, and if not why not?**
  - c. How many ship-days would best serve the Western Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific?**
  - d. Have cooperating / partner nations been approached to assist with this resource request?**

The potential benefit of having oiler support in the Eastern Pacific is recognized and various possible courses of action are being explored. Support from cooperating nations was included in the options. Unfortunately, analysis showed that none of the options was practicable because they did not provide a sufficient level of support for interdiction assets and/or the costs exceeded the benefit. Despite some interagency discussion, no other agency has indicated that it could fund oiler support in the Eastern Pacific.

6. **In calendar year 2002, *prior* to the hostilities in Iraq, I understand the source and transit zone experienced a shortfall of 43% in “on station days” of vessels in both the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean operating areas. This trend was also evident in detection and monitoring flight hours with shortfalls of 56% for the Eastern Pacific, and 67% for the Caribbean. Those types of surface and air assets are employed in a militarily unique manner and in ways that keep our Armed Forces practiced for their brave roles. Why are the resources that Congress paid to have employed in counternarcotics efforts not being utilized?**

As you are aware, the counternarcotics account pays the incremental costs for the deployment military assets. The operational costs for ships and aircraft are from within the Services' accounts. These assets are being fully utilized to fulfill important mission requirements throughout the world, during extremely demanding times.

7. **In every state of the union, we have National Guardsmen and women. Many of the States utilize these patriotic citizens in counternarcotics roles locally. For instance, the National Guard operates a fleet of C-26 sensor airplanes and OH-58 sensor helicopters to assist Federal, state and local counternarcotics operations. National Guardsmen were assisting at land and sea ports of entry, in the past. Medics were maintaining proficiency at local trauma centers. These activities were brought to a halt because the Secretary wanted to limit Department personnel to doing only military-centric tasks.**

**a. How has the Secretary's guidance impacted the readiness and proficiency of the National Guard personnel?**

The Secretary's guidance will improve the proficiency and readiness levels of National Guard personnel. Throughout the 54 states and territories, Guardsmen are used to provide both ground and aerial reconnaissance, intelligence and transportation support to the law enforcement community enhancing National Guard readiness and proficiency.

**b. Has the Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account funds and or National Guard funds currently or previously been utilized to compensate these personnel and fund the operation of the aircraft?**

The Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account is used to fund all the pay and allowances of Guardsmen who operate both the C-26 aircraft and OH-58 helicopters. In addition, the Central Transfer Account funds the maintenance contract for the C-26. Maintenance costs for the OH-58, as well as all the fuel and flying hour costs for both aircraft are funded directly through the respective service (Army or Air Force).

**c. Are any sensor upgrades planned for the aircraft to keep them capable and integrated with their active component counterparts?**

Upgrades for the OH-58 are currently on hold because the Army is in the process of phasing out the OH-58.

**d. Did the Department compensate any of the host experience providers, such as the hospitals or the border agencies for keeping military personnel proficient in peacetime?**

No. Support to border agencies and other law enforcement and community based organizations is provided to assist these organizations in the fight against illegal drugs. The proficiency gained by the National Guard personnel is incidental to the support being provided.

- 8. You have been given a large sum of money for Research, Development, Test & Evaluation from the Central Transfer Account. What new processes or equipment have been developed to win the battle of demand/supply reduction, or the treatment of drug abusers?**

The Central Transfer Account will provide \$11.6M for RDT&E in FY04, funding 25 counternarcotics technology development projects. RDT&E funds are focused on technologies that help us attack the supply of narcotics. We work cooperatively with other DoD and interagency partners such as DEA, FBI, and DHS to develop new technologies and methods in the areas of 1) Wide Area Surveillance, 2) Tagging, Tracking, and Locating (TTL), 3) Nonlethal Interdiction, and 4) intelligence fusion.

We are also executing two major congressionally-mandated R&D projects that promise increased homeland security as well as counternarcotics benefit: 1) Project Athena, which will demonstrate a comprehensive coastal security system, and 2) Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis, a cargo inspection system that will nonintrusively inspect entire semi-truck loads for drugs and other dangerous contraband.

9. The Department of Defense was designated as the single lead agency for detection and monitoring in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989. The Tethered Aerostat Radar System is an example of a detection system now run by the Department. This system was originally authorized in the 1986 Omnibus Drug Act, and was envisioned as a 14-unit picket line protecting the southern approaches of the United States from low flying aircraft. Unfortunately, the system was only implemented to a maximum of 12 balloons and has been allowed to wither to 7 presently, leaving key southern approaches to the United States unprotected. The Department has suggested it only benefits from a single balloon located in the Florida Keys.

- a. Why has the TARS capability slipped to half of the Congressional authorization?
- b. What has been done with the appropriated funds for the other half?

While the system originally had 14 sites, only eight sites are required to counter the current drug trafficking threat. Funding for the closed sites was used within the existing TARS program to provide a more robust and capable operational system.

10. General Eberhart of the U.S. Northern Command suggested either grounding the TARS balloons, except for the Florida Keys aerostat, or transferring the responsibility to another stakeholder, such as the Department of Homeland Security. The General's view seems to comport with the guidance from the Secretary, minimizing Department counternarcotics efforts, contrary to Congressional authorization and appropriation. What detection systems does DoD rely on to protect this nation from cruise missile attack from any southern location, east of Texas?

The FY04 Defense Appropriations Act directs the Commander, U.S. Northern Command to provide a report on the TARS. We are in the process of formulating a Departmental position regarding management of the aerostats. I would like to defer discussion of this report until we have completed these deliberations.

- 11. The TARS system also carries critical communication system repeaters and can deploy surface search sensors to detect in-coming go fast drug smuggling vessels. However, virtually all of the aerostats close to our sea border approaches have been decommissioned. Can you explain to me how this degradation was justified in light of your lead agency role for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime smuggling?**

I believe that the eight counternarcotics TARS sites located along the southwest border and across the southern corridor of the U.S. are properly positioned to respond to narcotics trafficking patterns. These TARS continue to provide a low-altitude, small target detection system, used for the tracking and interdiction of aircraft meeting drug trafficking profiles.

**12. The White House's National Drug Control Strategy only mentions DoD counternarcotics activities twice, on pages 31 and 51. The DoD counternarcotics funding amounts to approximately 1/12 of the total counternarcotics budget. By comparison, the DoD counternarcotics appropriation is 174% of the entire ONDCP budget. Can you explain why your activities and contributions are so minimally covered in the National Strategy when such a proportionally large proportion of the available funding goes to the Department?**

As you have noted, the Defense Department is a key partner in implementing the National Drug Control Strategy. Our contributions are highlighted in detail in the ONDCP FY 05 Budget Summary. We work with ONDCP prior to publication of the Strategy to ensure the Department's contributions are fully represented.

13. The Barry M. Goldwater Range covers approximately the western one third of the land border between the State of Arizona and Mexico. The range also claims significant land north of the border. This range is used for air to air and air to ground training. As the U.S. Border Patrol has become more effective preventing and intercepting illegal immigration in the built-up areas, more and more human and contraband smuggling has migrated to austere areas as the Goldwater Range. Regrettably, the DoD elements for the range, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps, have refused to allow Federal law enforcement agencies access to the air and land along the border. As a result, *countless illegal aliens and loads of drugs enter this country by way of DoD-controlled land.* I held a field hearing in Sells, Arizona one year ago. Some of the DHS witnesses testified about the magnitude of the smuggling problem and how critical access to the border area is. They also informed me about the phenomenal number of people who die in this area from exposure.
- a. Why have the Air Force officials at Luke Air Force Base and the Pentagon refused to promulgate a memorandum of understanding between DoD and DHS for law enforcement access to the range in the immediate area of the border?
  - b. Are you prepared to take responsibility for preventing all alien and drug smuggling through your range?

Since the Barry M. Goldwater Range covers approximately one-third of the western land border between Arizona and Mexico, we work very closely with Border Control. My office has contacted Northern Command, Joint Task Force Six, Operation Alliance in El Paso, Texas, and Border Patrol Office in Yuma, Arizona. We have yet to speak to anyone with knowledge of a problem with the US Air Force and US Marine Corps refusing to allow federal law enforcement on the Range. To the contrary, the Assistant Chief of Patrol in Yuma, Arizona indicated that they have an outstanding relationship with the Air Force.

**14. Please explain the request to raise the congressionally authorized personnel limitation in Colombia.**

**a. How will the additional personnel contribute to the supply reduction efforts in Colombia?**

We are currently restricted in Colombia (under Section 3204 of Public Law 106-246) to 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors in support of Plan Colombia. Our efforts to support Colombia are nearing the limits of this cap.

In order to better support President Uribe's campaign to defeat the narcoterrorists in Colombia, increasing the personnel cap to 800 military personnel and 600 civilian contractors will provide additional training, equipment, planning & assistance teams, and intelligence support as follows:

- Additional military will allow increased training and support for:
  - Operational and intelligence planning assistance teams
  - Transportation and mobility
  - Intelligence collection and analysis
  - Casualty evacuation
- Additional civilian contractors will allow increased training and support for:
  - Logistics
  - Mobility
  - Communications

**b. Will the cost of deploying twice the number of DoD personnel to Colombia be funded from the CTA or will you be requesting an additional appropriation?**

The current proposal with USD(C) for sourcing the requirement for \$108 million is that over two years, the Department of Defense would provide 2/3 of the amount from outside of the CN central transfer account (CTA), and the remaining 1/3 would be sourced from inside the CTA.

	<u>FY04</u>	<u>FY05</u>	<u>Total</u>
Non-CN funding	\$50M	\$21M	\$71M
Central Transfer Account funds	\$15M	\$22M	\$37M
Total	\$65M	\$43M	\$108M

We had to make some very difficult decisions. Further impacting the problem was the FY04 Congressional reductions and must-fund UFRs. We had to fund \$37M internally from a very narrow scope of programs.

In FY04, the \$50M in additional funding from the Department will arrive via a reprogramming that will require Congressional approval. The FY05 funds will enter the CTA via PBD 723.

**c. Whom have you briefed and what is the status of the request?**

We are engaged in a coordinated effort with State to get legislation to raise the limit on United States personnel in Colombia. The following congressional staff have received joint briefings: HASC, SASC, HAC, SAC, HIRC, SFRC, Speaker's National Security Advisor, and Senate Drug Caucus. Briefings to Representative Taylor and House Minority Leader Pelosi have also been scheduled.

On 26 March 2004, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas J. Feith, signed letters to key members of Congress requesting their support. These letters were sent to:

- Senator John Warner (SASC)
- Rep. Duncan Hunter (HASC)
- Rep. Jerry Lewis (HAC-D)
- Senator Ted Stevens (SAC-D)
- Speaker of the House Hastert
- Senate Majority Leader Frist

State Department has forwarded a legislative proposal to the Hill which requests an increase to the cap. We are hopeful that Congress will choose the most expedient legislative vehicle.

**15. Maintaining a drug-free workplace is an endeavor that most businesses and all of the Federal Government pursues.**

**a. Why is DoD the only department to itemize drug free workplace efforts under “demand reduction” as a major counternarcotics program?**

Because of the unique requirements, demands and consequences of a drug free workplace program in a military environment, DoD Drug Demand Program develops policy and directives more tailored to this environment than those policies and directives used by other government agencies. DoD budgets, executes and accounts for approximately \$100M drug demand reduction counternarcotics money.

Over a 30 year history the DoD program has developed a complex and efficient integration of the field collection, laboratory analysis, legal, education and treatment aspects of drug free workplace program. The program is centrally managed from the DASD-CN Program manager across all the services for active, reserve and National Guard components.

**b. As you have expended funds for this purpose, what percentage of the military and civilian force have been tested?**

**c. What percentage of the active and reserve component forces have been tested?**

Military: Current policy is to test at a minimum frequency of 1 random test per year. This will be phased in over several years.

Active: Over 100%

Army and Air Force selected Reservists: 39% and 21% respectively.

Navy and Marine Corps selected Reservists: approximately 100%

Air and Army National Guard: 36% and 44% respectively.

Civilian: Approximately 50% of the Test Designated Positions (TDP) are currently tested. In FY05 the goal is to test 100% of the TDPs.

**d. What percentage of the drug tests have returned positive for the use of drugs?**

Military: 0.98

Because of our robust testing and education efforts, this percentage is significantly lower than the general population.

**e. What percentage of deployed troops have tested positive for drug use?**

FY03: 1.29%

This is consistent with non-deployed Army positive rates which is the primary deployed force.

**f. Of the positive drug test results, what conclusions has DoD drawn about the drugs of abuse and the demographics of the abuser?**

- The high risk group (HRG) is 18-25 year old males
- The percent positive for the HRG for active, reserve and national guard is 2.49%, 2.55% and 2.43% respectively.
- Based on past DoD Worldwide Survey the percent response for the HRG for past 30 day use of illegal drugs was 17%.
- Recent military drug policies appear to deter illicit drug use among enlistees.

**g. What treatment programs are available to personnel who test positive for drug use and what are the requirements for entry into a program?**

The services have various treatment modalities that can be tailored to the individual situation. More detail is given in Enclosure 1.

**h. What percentage of positive drug tests result in legal action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice?**

Current policy is to process 100% of the military members who knowingly use a prohibited drug for separation from military service. Retention in military service of military members who knowingly use a prohibited drug must be approved by the member's Special Courts-martial Convening Authority or higher authority.

**Enclosure 1**

For active duty and reserve members on extended active duty for more than 30 days: The unit commander will refer individuals suspected or identified as alcohol and/or other drug abusers, including those identified through urinalysis (except those determined legitimate medical use by the Medical Review Officer) and/or blood alcohol tests, to the Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) counseling center for screening. Soldiers may also self-refer to the ASAP counseling center for assistance. In addition to referrals from medical or law enforcement agencies, other sources (for example, military Chaplains) may identify or refer military personnel suspected of alcohol or other drug

abuse. Referrals from sources other than command, medical, and investigation will be handled in the same manner as a self-referral.

**16. Please explain the emerging threats program. How many Afghan Border Guards have been trained and to what level? What specific command and control upgrades have been made in Uzbekistan for their Border Patrol vessels? What specific infrastructure enhancements have been made for the Tajikistan Border Guards?**

The emerging threats program referred to support activities in the CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM regions where we believed there was a nexus between narcotics and terrorism. We no longer use that term because these commands now implement their individual counternarcoterrorism programs.

Germany has the lead in training Afghan police, including Border Police. As of the middle of this month, Germany has trained almost 3700 police, including 750 Border Police. Germany has established a National Police Academy, and is almost finished constructing a separate academy for Border Police.

The State Department is supporting Germany's police training efforts. It has established several regional training centers, and as of the middle of this month has trained almost 5700 policemen.

Our counternarcotics assistance program, which is being coordinated with the State Department, will provide infrastructure, order checkpoints, and a communications system for the Border Police. USCENTCOM is responsible for execution.

DoD supported Uzbekistan and Tajikistan's counternarcotics efforts in FY03 by funding radio communications systems, computer systems, databases and analytical software, and assistance with constructing bases of operations.

**17. On the subject of Joint Inter Agency Task Forces, I have been very impressed by the interagency cooperation exhibited by all parties. The JIATFs focus their energy on specific areas of responsibility. The multiple source intelligence fusion and dissemination to all participating parties is exemplary. Each JIATF has unique resource requirements to address their specific area. I understand the new U.S. Northern Command has been so impressed with the interagency cooperation and coordination exhibited at JIATF-South and JIATF-West that they want to start their own JIATF.**

- a. Within the context of the ONDCP three-pronged National Strategy, what counternarcotics focus will JIATF-North take?**

The JIATF-North concept is still being discussed with DHS and specific roles and missions have not been finalized.

- b. What are the current delineations of areas of responsibility for all of the standing Task Forces?**

JIATF-South is responsible for CN activities within the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR) and part of PACOM AOR along the eastern Pacific and NORTHCOM's AOR in the Caribbean. This allows a single command, SOUTHCOM, to focus on the flow of drugs from South America to the United States. JIATF-West is responsible for CN activities within the PACOM AOR, with increased focus in the western Pacific.

- c. Are you reviewing conceptual and operational plans to ensure the efficiency of the Task Forces?**

Conceptual and operational plans for the Joint Task Forces are under continuous review and receive additional scrutiny during the annual budget and POM processes.

- d. What will JIATF-West be doing in the Pacific Command area of responsibility?**

JIATF-West is responsible for CN activities directed at threats emanating from the west toward the United States and for providing CN support to cooperating nations in the PACOM AOR.

- e. As JIATF-South is already incredibly under resourced, how will the new resource requirements of both JIATF-West and -North impact current and future operations in the source and transit zone?**

If you are talking about dollars, I'm not aware that JIATF-South is under resourced. If you are speaking of air and maritime resources, they will be allocated based on threats and Departmental priorities.

**18. I am concerned that the F-16 “Coronet Nighthawk” operation was part of the justification to the Congress for the request for an appropriation for the military construction in the Netherlands Antilles. The funds were made available and the facilities are completed, but DoD has withdrawn the F-16 aircraft as mission incompatible. Worse, with the sudden, self-imposed urgency within the Department to close Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station, and without a thought-out plan to relocate the units assigned there, the Curacao facility has been overcome with new DoD tenants. Most of these units do not contribute to source and transit zone counternarcotics missions but they prevent other counternarcotics assets from utilizing the facility.**

**a. What are you doing to reclaim Curacao as an interdepartmental counternarcotics base?**

With the closure of Roosevelt Roads, SOUTHCOM has been able to forward deploy aircraft at the FOLs, which places them much closer to transit zone trafficking patterns. The increased utilization at Curacao has been a significant enhancement to our detection and monitoring (D&M) efforts in the transit zone.

**b. Can you explain which agencies, which type aircraft, and what missions will operate from the Netherlands Antilles, in lieu of Coronet Nighthawk aircraft?**

The FOL at Curacao has a physical capacity of 12 aircraft (2 large, 4 medium and 6 small). These aircraft assigned to the FOL, all performing CN missions (either D&M or Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)), may include U.S. Navy P-3, EP-3 and E-2, U.S. Air Force E-3, KC-135 and EC-130, U.S. Coast Guard HC-130, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement C-550, C-12, P-3A, and P-3B.

**1. Please tell me about the counternarcotics activities of the U.S. Pacific Command, prior to the decision to move JIATF-West to that Combatant Command. Please detail how these activities correlate to each of the prongs of the National Strategy.**

Joint Interagency Task Force West, like its counterpart in Key West, does not directly participate in Priorities I (Prevention) and II (Treatment of Drug Users) of the National Drug Control Strategy. JIATF West focuses on Priority III of the National Strategy (Disrupting the Market) by supporting counterdrug efforts outside of the United States. JIATF West in partnership with US federal law enforcement and Partner Nation counterdrug agencies, disrupts the drug trafficking business cycle that keeps drug organizations viable, thus reducing the available supply of drugs.

JIATF West stood up in 1989 as a component of US Pacific Command. Serving as executive agent for counterdrug programs, JIATF West has a distinguished record of providing unique DOD resources to detect and monitor drug movements and provide the circumstances for US law enforcement to interdict these shipments. From inception to the last eastern Pacific mission conducted 30 September 2003, JIATF West was directly responsible for assisting drug law enforcement agencies to interdict approximately 240 MT of cocaine, conservatively estimated at over 5 billion dollars. Virtually all of this cocaine was enroute to the United States and the seizures and disruptions directly supported the efforts to target and impede the drug traffickers' supply routes. These interdictions represent some of the largest maritime seizures ever recorded, highlighted by two particularly large seizures in 2001 that totaled approximately 20 MT of cocaine.

JIATF West has been coordinating counterdrug training in Asia since 1995. This training has been provided to enhance the professionalism and capabilities of Partner Nation police and paramilitary units with counterdrug responsibilities in Thailand and Malaysia. This training has led to more secure border areas and successful raids of drug labs and storage sites.

JIATF West has also been deploying skilled intelligence analysts to support various Country Teams in both USCENTCOM and USPACOM geographic areas of responsibility since 1994. These analyst deployments have been at the specific request of US law enforcement agencies and have resulted in tailored intelligence packages for use by US and foreign law enforcement agencies.

JIATF West has expanded the USPACOM theater-wide counterdrug training plan to include other nations in the region. To further enhance Partner Nation capabilities, JIATF West also provides infrastructure project support as requested by US federal law enforcement agencies. These efforts will compliment detection and monitoring operations in the region as we enlist the cooperation of regional nations.

The expansion of operations in Asia is in response to changes in the priorities of the Combatant Commander following the events of September 11, 2001. Immediately following the attack on the World Trade Center, it became apparent that worldwide terrorist organizations were using many of the same modes, methods and routes as drug traffickers. DOD has sought opportunities to leverage existing interagency relationships to further define the drug-terrorism nexus. The JIATF organization provides an ideal mode to attack this nexus within the USPACOM area of responsibility.

**2. *What is the time line for JIATF-West to complete its move to Hawaii and become operational?***

JIATF West is in the initial stages of relocating to Hawaii. We will attain initial operational capability in August and will reach full operational capability by December of this year.

**3. *A prevalent Pacific Command smuggling threat is by vessel.***

**a. *How do you plan to focus your efforts at detecting, intercepting and interdicting them?***

We will continue to improve our knowledge of the norm or baseline maritime traffic in the western Pacific. We are expanding our understanding of the modes, methods and frequency of maritime drug trafficking across the theater by deploying tactical analysis teams to various countries to work with US federal law enforcement agencies and their Partner Nation counterparts to glean information and develop a comprehensive intelligence picture. Development of such a maritime baseline will lead to the development of actionable intelligence that we will share, through Country Teams, with the respective Partner Nations for action. Currently we have teams deployed in Japan (to work against the North Korean problem), Thailand, and the Philippines, and have plans to expand this program to other US Country Teams in the region.

Operationally, our intent is to conduct a series of survey patrols in maritime areas suspected of having high levels of smuggling, such as the Andaman Sea, South China Sea, Gulf of Thailand, Celebes Sea, Sulu Sea, and the Java Sea. These patrols will contribute to the intelligence baseline regarding the level of activity (both legitimate and illicit) that is occurring in those areas. We estimate that this may take up to three years to accomplish. For comparison purposes, establishing this same baseline level of intelligence for operations in the eastern Pacific took approximately five years.

***b. Who will coordinate the Naval component forces utilized to address the threat?***

Once an appropriate baseline level of intelligence has been established, we envision using a limited number of U.S. ships and aircraft, supported by a more robust number of Partner Nation assets, to conduct sustained detection and monitoring operations of drug trafficking activity in Asia and across the western Pacific. While the precise nature of the command and coordination procedures for these forces has not yet been fully developed, we believe it will resemble the model previously used for eastern Pacific CD operations. The pivotal difference will be a much greater interagency involvement by partner nation maritime police, coast guard and naval elements.

JIATF West has developed a plan to provide command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities to key maritime Partner Nations. These facilities, known as Maritime Operational Intelligence Fusion Centers (MOIFC) are being planned and constructed in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Additional facility locations may include Malaysia and India. These centers will be integral to the sharing of information and leveraging of maritime law enforcement and naval units necessary to conduct detection, monitoring and interdiction operations across the broad expanse of USPACOM's area of responsibility.

***c. Will Naval surface assets have U.S. Coast Guard personnel embarked to provide law enforcement powers?***

Like operations in the eastern Pacific, we feel that embarked USCG law enforcement detachments aboard DOD assets, and possibly even partner nation assets, will be an essential part of the program. The USCG is developing a more robust plan for deploying LEDETs at greater distances from the US and we are confident

these teams will play an important role in western Pacific law enforcement interdiction operations.

**4. How are your efforts divided between the eastern and western Pacific maritime approaches?**

As of 01 October 2003, JIATF West no longer has responsibility for D&M operations in the eastern Pacific.

**5. What illicit drugs are your detection and interception efforts primarily focused on?**

The primary drug threats in Asia are heroin and methamphetamine. Asian heroin originates in the Golden Triangle region of Burma, Thailand and Laos. Recently, North Korea has also begun to produce heroin and there are indications this drug production may be state-sponsored. Methamphetamine is widely produced in Asia, with Burma and the Philippines contributing significant amounts of this drug. Asian methamphetamine has appeared in a growing number of US cities thus compounding the existing domestic production problem. Marijuana and hashish transit the Pacific bound for the North American market; however this is a secondary drug target for JIATF West.

**6. Of the vessels transiting the Pacific, which ones most typically contain illicit cargos?**

Drug movement between countries in Asia is usually conducted using small fishing boats. These boats are used to move drugs from one province in a country to another or across maritime and riverine borders from one country to another. Large drug consignments destined for outside of the region are usually hidden in cargo containers transiting aboard commercial ships. Bulk shipments of marijuana and hashish are often shipped aboard bulk freighters or ocean-going sailboats that are contracted or operated by Western drug organizations.

**7. Where does the JIATF-West area of responsibility converge with JIATF-South and what "passage of lines" procedures exist to prevent losing a suspect vessel?**

The new Joint Operating Area establishes the boundary for drug detection, monitoring and interdiction in the eastern Pacific at a point approximately 100 nm west of San Diego. This is the convergence of the areas of responsibility for USPACOM and

USSOUTHCOM. Ships transiting west of this point are the responsibility of JIATF West. Areas to the east of this line are the responsibility of JIATF South.

To date, no suspected drug vessels have been noted transiting this boundary in any direction. Should an event of this type occur, JIATF West and JIATF South would employ hand-off procedures similar to those developed between 1989-2003 when such cooperative actions were routinely conducted against drug shipments originating in South America enroute to Mexico.

**8. Please explain the connectivity of JIATF-West into Pacific Command. How will intelligence and resource sharing be guaranteed?**

JIATF West is a component of USPACOM and the Director reports directly to Admiral Fargo. As a standing Joint Interagency Task Force, JIATF West is a supported command and receives required assistance from other USPACOM components such as the Pacific Fleet, Pacific Air Forces, Army Forces - Pacific, Marine Forces - Pacific, Special Operations Command - Pacific and the Joint Intelligence Center - Pacific. JIATF West has the ability to task these components for resources necessary to meet its operational and intelligence requirements.

All JIATF West activities are included in USAPCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan and are aligned with the Mission Performance Plans which are developed by and support US Country Teams across Asia. In addition, JIATF West is permanently assigning a Regional Command Representative to the Country Team in Thailand to provide oversight and coordination of all counterdrug intelligence initiatives, Partner Nation training, and infrastructure development programs in Asia.

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## UnClass Discovery Brief 20 Apr 04

Primary Precedence: PRIORITY

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Message Type: OPERATIONS

Declass By: JOHN F. SATTLER, MAJGEN, USMC, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS

Declass Reason:

Declass Date:

Subject: CDRUSCENTCOM GUIDANCE FOR THE DISPOSITION OF DRUGS AND PERSONS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY WHEN DRUGS ARE DISCOVERED DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

UNCLASSIFIED

OPER/ENDURING FREEDOM//

MSGID/GENADMIN/USCENTCOM//

REF/A/(U) MSG/DIAIMADS/230152Z JAN 03//

AMPN/POTUS LTR TO UK PM//

REF/B/(U) ORDER/CJCS/221935Z DEC 03//

REF/C/(U)

REF/I/MSG/CJCS/052145Z DEC 02//

AMPN/MOD 4 TO OEF ROE: AUTHORIZATION SERIAL TWO//

NARR/(U)

1. PER REFS A AND B, THIS IS A USCENTCOM AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION (DEA) COORDINATED MESSAGE PROMULGATING GUIDANCE FOR CFC-A. THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED AS SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE WITH RESPECT TO U.S. MILITARY MISSIONS CURRENTLY CONDUCTED IN AFGHANISTAN. IT IS BROAD IN NATURE SO AS NOT TO DETRACT FROM THE CONDUCT OF THE PRIMARY MISSION OF CFC-A ORGANIZATIONS. THIS MESSAGE CLARIFIES CURRENT AUTHORITIES. THE MESSAGE SUPERCEDES DRUG REFERENCES AND GUIDANCE INCLUDED IN CJTF-180 MESSAGES//

RMKS/1. (U) SITUATION

1.A. (U) GENERAL: NO CHANGE.

1.B. (U) AREA OF CONCERN

1.C. (U) ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AND THREAT SUMMARY

1.D. (U) ASSESSMENT OF CAUSES OF INSTABILITY. NO CHANGE.

2. FRIENDLY FORCES. NO CHANGE.

2.A. (U) HIGHER MISSION: NO CHANGE.

3. (U) DISPOSITION OF PERSONS AND DRUGS DISCOVERED IN AFGHANISTAN DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS.

3.A. (U) CFC-A DOES NOT HAVE A COUNTER-DRUG OR LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSION. THE SEIZURE OR DESTRUCTION OF DRUGS THAT ARE DISCOVERED DURING THE CONDUCT OF NORMAL MILITARY OPERATIONS WILL NOT CONVERT THE MILITARY OPERATION INTO A COUNTER-DRUG OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATION. THIS ACTION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL USCENTCOM MISSION STATEMENT OF ESTABLISHING A SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (GOA).

3.B. (U) CFC-A WILL PREPARE INSTRUCTIONS, GUIDANCE AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS CONSISTENT WITH THIS GUIDANCE TO BE USED BY ON SCENE COMMANDERS (OSC) WHEN DRUGS OR DRUG RELATED PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT ARE DISCOVERED.

3. C. (U) ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHEN DRUGS ARE DISCOVERED

DURING NORMAL CFC-A MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN.

3.C.1. (U) CFC-A WILL REPORT ALL DRUG RELATED DISCOVERIES

AND SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS AS A SIGNIFICANT ACTION.

3.C.2. (U) WHEN DRUGS ARE DISCOVERED BY A CFC-A UNIT DURING

NORMAL MILITARY OPERATIONS THE UNIT OSC WILL COORDINATE WITH CFC-A VIA CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS REGARDLESS OF THE AMOUNT OF DRUGS DISCOVERED. THE UNIT OSC IS AUTHORIZED TO DESTROY THE DRUGS IN PLACE IF COORDINATION WITH CFC-A IS IMPRACTICAL OR IS PROHIBITED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION.

3.C.4. (U) THE US DEA IS INTERESTED IN BULK DRUG CACHES. CFC-A WILL IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE DEA IN AFGHANISTAN, RELEVANT UK AUTHORITIES AND RELEVANT AFGHAN AUTHORITIES TO COORDINATE AND DETERMINE THE BEST AND LEAST INTRUSIVE COURSE OF ACTION FOR THE OSC TO EXECUTE THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CFC-A MISSION. CFC-A HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE WITH THE PLANNED MISSION IF OPERATIONAL NECESSITY OR THE TACTICAL SITUATION PROHIBITS WAITING.

3. D. (U) ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHEN DRUG CROP FIELDS ARE

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Unclass Discovery Brief 20 Apr 04  
 DISCOVERED DURING CFC-A MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN.  
 3.D.1. (U) CFC-A UNITS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO DESTROY OR  
 DAMAGE DRUG CROPS.  
 3.D.3. (U) CFC-A UNITS WILL REPORT THE LOCATIONS OF DRUG CROPS.  
 3.F. (U) MISSION PERMITTING, CFC-A WILL CONDUCT A LIMITED  
 SITE EXPLOITATION FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PURPOSES ONLY. PHONE  
 LISTS AND MONEY WILL BE PROCESSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3.C.2.  
 3.G. (U) ALL ACTIONS DIRECTED BY THIS MESSAGE ARE CONSISTENT  
 WITH THE AUTHORITY TO CONFISCATE ANY FORMS OF RECORD KEEPING OR  
 COMMUNICATION DEVICES FOR INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION RELATED TO  
 TERRORIST OR ANTI-COALITION FORCES.  
 3.H. (U) PERSONS DETAINED AT DRUG DISCOVERY SITES AND WHO POSE A  
 SECURITY RISK WILL BE PROCESSED USING EXISTING CFC-A DETAINEE  
 PROCEDURES.  
 4. (U) POCs: QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE USCENTCOM DRUG  
 DISPOSITION GUIDANCE SHOULD BE DIRECTED CCJ3-JIACG-CNT, DSN 651-1939,  
 1945, COMM 813-827-1939, 1945.  
 4.A. (U) THE POC FOR THE DEA LIAISON OFFICER TO DOD, OSD,  
 DOD CTF, CENTCOM AND NORTHCOM DEA OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS  
 IS THE SENIOR SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT AT COMM 202-307-8860; PENTAGON  
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 CLASSIFIED BY: JOHN F. SATTTLER, MAJGEN, USMC, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS  
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 DeclassReason:  
 DeclassDate:

## TO Addressees

(OR1) CFC, CFCAC35C  
 (DN1) DOD, ARMY, DEPLOYED, CFCA, CFCA C3(SC)  
 CC/Info Addressees  
 (OR1) HEFL21, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC  
 (DN1) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, U-2, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC  
 (OR2) HEFL21, SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
 (DN2) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, R-S, SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
 (OR3) HEFL21, SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
 (DN3) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, R-S, SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
 (OR4) HEFL21, JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC  
 (DN4) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, I-M, JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC  
 (OR5) HEFL21, DA WASHINGTON DC  
 (DN5) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, D, DA WASHINGTON DC  
 (OR6) HEFL21, CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
 (DN6) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, CE-CS, CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
 (OR7) SBDQIMF13, CNO WASHINGTON DC  
 (DN7) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, CE-CS, CNO WASHINGTON DC  
 (OR8) SBDQIMF13, COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC  
 (DN8) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, CE-CS, COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC  
 (OR9) HEFL21, DIA WASHINGTON DC  
 (DN9) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, D, DIA WASHINGTON DC  
 (OR10) HEFL21, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC  
 (DN10) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, D, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC  
 (OR11) HEFL21, DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
 (DN11) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, D, DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
 (OR12) SILWA4, CMDCTR(MC)  
 (DN12) DOD, SOCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, USSOCOM COMMAND CENTER(MC)  
 (OR13) RGJ1MF13, COMUSNAVCENT  
 (DN13) DOD, AUTODIN PLAS, CE-CS, COMUSNAVCENT  
 (OR14) NCBW1MF13, COMUSMARCENT



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

OCT 1 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES  
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Department Drug Demand Reduction Policy

The use of prohibited drugs adversely impacts the effectiveness, safety and discipline in the Armed Forces and the Department's civilian workforce. The focus of the Department's Drug Demand Reduction Program is to deter service members, their families and Department civilian personnel from using prohibited drugs.

Pursuant to the Department's counternarcotics policy, dated July 31, 2002 and signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, this office is authorized to develop and implement the Department's counternarcotics policy. Therefore, the following constitutes policy concerning drug demand reduction. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Heads of the Defense Civilian Components will issue guidance to implement this policy. The primary method for deterring the use of prohibited drugs is through urine drug testing. Service members and civilian personnel who knowingly use prohibited drugs will be identified and face consequences for their actions. All Department personnel and military family members will be offered anti-drug education that has objective performance measures. This policy, set forth on October 1, 2003, extends the Department's drug demand reduction policy in the following three DoD policy statements:

- Directive 1010.1, "Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program," dated December 9, 1994;
- Directive 1010.9, "DoD Civilian Employees Drug Abuse Testing Program," dated August 23, 1988; and
- Instruction 1010.16, "Technical Procedures for the Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program," dated December 9, 1994.

ASD (SO/LIC) memorandum, "Department of Defense Civilian Drug Testing", dated January 10, 2001, is rescinded.

  
Thomas W. O'Connell

Attachment:  
Appendix, General Drug Demand Reduction Policy Implementation Guidelines

## Appendix

## General Drug Demand Reduction Policy Implementation Guidelines

The Department shall:

- Maintain a forensic drug testing program based upon random selection for all Department military members and civilian personnel in testing designated positions;
- Conduct drug testing for all military members at a minimum average testing rate for each Service, the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard of one test per member per year. Testing rates for active duty, reserve and National Guard forces will be calculated separately;
- Conduct drug testing for civilian employees in testing designated positions at a minimum average testing rate for each Agency or Component of one test per testing designated employee per year;
- Ensure that selected senior Department members who are in the random testing program and are not identified and tested have at least one drug test during the year. These senior personnel include executive level and senior executive service civilians holding testing designated positions and flag rank officer members DoD-wide;
- Conduct mandatory drug testing for applicants prior to entering military service, with consequences currently outlined by the Secretary of Defense memorandum dated May 11, 2000;
- Conduct mandatory drug testing for applicants to become Department civilians in testing designated positions with consequences outlined by the head of the Agency or Component;
- Conduct mandatory drug testing for new military entrants from the delayed entry program within 72 hours of entering active duty beginning October 1, 2004;
- Process military members who knowingly use a prohibited drug for separation from military service. Retention in military service of military members who knowingly use a prohibited drug must be approved by the member's Special Courts-martial Convening Authority or higher authority;
- Discipline civilian and military personnel who knowingly use prohibited drugs as appropriate;

- Operate military drug testing laboratories that test urine specimens collected from military members or applicants, regardless of the urine donor's Service affiliation;
- Test military members and military applicants at a minimum for use of marijuana, cocaine and amphetamines;
- Test civilian employees in testing-designated positions for use of the drugs mandated by federal guidelines;
- Conduct anti-drug education programs, with objective measures of effectiveness, for military members, their families, and for civilian employees;
- Sponsor anti-drug programs for community schools and activities that are on, or formally associated with, military installations;
- Sponsor community counternarcotics outreach programs through the National Guard, with objective measures of effectiveness, and that are funded in accordance with the Secretary's annual guidance for State Plans; and
- Participate in national anti-drug campaigns, such as the National Family Partnership's Red Ribbon Week, that encourage members, families and citizens to lead healthy, drug-free lifestyles.



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

OCT 2 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Department Support to Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies Performing  
Counternarcotics Activities

As a consequence of the changed national security environment, the Department must improve its use of resources and personnel that support the war on terrorism, homeland defense, and other objectives. Operational tempo is high and our forces face many challenges.

We are responding to the new security environment in a number of ways. For instance, a new Combatant Command (USNORTHCOM) has been established and is now responsible for Title 10 military support to domestic civil authorities, to include Counternarcotics support to Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies. It is appropriate, therefore, to assess the Department's support to domestic law enforcement agencies with counternarcotics responsibilities.

The Office of Counternarcotics conducted a complete program review and will restructure the domestic counternarcotics program to generate greater benefit from the execution of these missions.

Objectives:

1. The Department will reduce the operational stress on Title 10, United States Code (Title 10) (active duty and reserve) forces that conduct domestic counternarcotics activities through utilization of Title 32, United States Code (Title 32) (National Guard) forces.



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2. The Department will concentrate its counternarcotics support on those militarily unique skills and capabilities that domestic law enforcement agencies lack, or cannot practically replicate.
3. The Department will employ those measures designed to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail any activity that is reasonably related to narcotics trafficking. This includes, but is not limited to, measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail activities related to substances, materiel, weapons or resources used to finance, support, secure, cultivate, process, or transport illegal drugs.

Henceforth, pursuant to this new approach, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) shall be responsible for reviewing and approving Title 10 counternarcotics support, except where authority is delegated per Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3710.01. This policy is designed to incorporate the provision of the Department Policy titled, "Counternarcotics Mission Transfer Plan", dated January 31, 2003.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense counternarcotics policy memorandum dated July 31, 2002, stipulates that the Department of Defense will execute drug demand and supply demand reduction programs consistent with statutory responsibilities, Presidential direction, and Department priorities. Specifically, the Department will implement Demand Reduction Programs that promote readiness of the Armed Forces and the Department's civilian personnel and that reduce illegal drug use within the Department's communities. The Department will also implement Supply Reduction Programs that collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence, support interdiction operations and train Counternarcotics forces.

Pursuant to the July 31, 2002 counternarcotics policy above, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, reporting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, shall develop and implement the Department's counternarcotics policy.

This policy provides detailed guidance for requests for Department counternarcotics support to domestic law enforcement agencies. This policy will be effective on October 1, 2003. Within the domestic context, this policy supersedes:

- The domestic elements of the Department policy titled, "Military Support to Counternarcotics Activities", dated October 6, 1998.
- Department policy titled, "Priorities, Policies, and Procedures for Department of Defense support to Domestic Drug Law Enforcement Agencies", dated January 26, 1995.

- Department policy titled, "Department Training Support to U.S. Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies", dated June 29, 1996.

I request that the Director, Joint Staff, distribute this policy to the Combatant Commanders.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Paul W. Hefner", with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Attachments:

Appendix A  
General Domestic Policy Implementation Guidelines

Appendix B  
Criteria for Approving Support for Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies

Appendix C  
Title 10, United States Code, Support

Appendix D  
Approval Procedures for Title 10, United States Code, Domestic Counternarcotics Support

Appendix E  
Title 32, United States Code, Support

Appendix F  
Approval Procedures for Title 32, United States Code, Domestic Counternarcotics Support

## Appendix A

## General Domestic Policy Implementation Guidelines

- Department personnel shall include Active Component, Reserve Component, and National Guard, unless such personnel are otherwise authorized by law.
- Department personnel will not directly participate in law enforcement activities such as search, seizure, arrest, or similar activities.
- Department personnel will not accompany law enforcement agents on actual counternarcotics field operations where the likelihood of danger or civilian casualties is imminent. Department personnel will make every effort to minimize the possibility of confrontation with civilians.
- Department personnel will not provide counternarcotics-funded, advanced military training to domestic law enforcement personnel. Advanced military training is defined as high intensity instruction that focuses on the tactics, techniques, and procedures required to apprehend, arrest, detain, search for, or seize a criminal suspect when the potential for violent confrontation exists. It includes advanced marksmanship (including sniper training), military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), advanced MOUT, close quarters battle/close quarters combat (CQB/CQC), and similar specialized training.
- The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD(P)) must approve all requests for Title 10, United States Code (Title 10) counternarcotics support to domestic law enforcement agencies, except where authority is delegated per CJCSI 3710.01. Where authorized by law, the Department will seek reimbursement, prior to approval.
- The Secretary of Defense is the approval authority for Department-funded counternarcotics missions using forces on Title 32, United States Code (Title 32) state status, through the Governor's annual State Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities Plans, pursuant to Title 32, USC 112.
- Combatant Commanders are responsible for executing this policy in their respective areas of operations as it regards the use of Title 10 forces for counternarcotics activities.

## Appendix B

### Criteria for Approving Support for Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies

All requests for Department support must satisfy the following criteria:

**Valid Counterdrug activities nexus.** This is the prime factor in considering support to domestic law enforcement agencies. The term "counterdrug activities" includes those measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail any activity that is reasonably related to narcotics trafficking. This includes, but is not limited to, measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail activities related to substances, materiel, weapons or resources used to finance, support, secure, cultivate, process, or transport illegal drugs.

**Proper Request.**

- An appropriate official of a federal, state, or local government agency who has responsibility for counternarcotics activities must request the support.
- Federal law must authorize the Department to provide the requested support.
- The support will assist the requesting agency in accomplishing its counternarcotics activities within the U.S.
- The support is consistent with the Department's implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy.
- Department-funded support is limited to those activities that are:
  - Militarily unique; and
  - Significantly benefit the Department of Defense; or
  - Are essential to national security goals.

**Militarily unique.** This is defined as: "unique skills and capabilities possessed by Department personnel that domestic law enforcement lacks or cannot practically replicate with a similar level of expertise."

- Specific examples of militarily unique skills are in Appendices C and E.

**Readiness.** Department personnel may provide support to domestic law enforcement agencies as long as that support improves unit readiness or mission capability.

**Military training value.** The support must provide a training opportunity that contributes to combat readiness.

- Department personnel will not perform clerical or administrative duties such as secretarial, receptionist, or janitorial tasks. Department personnel will not perform maintenance on, or provide logistics support for, civilian law enforcement vehicles/equipment. Operational support to domestic law enforcement agencies is designed to enhance the effectiveness of the supported agency. The support is not designed to release law enforcement officers for other drug enforcement duties.

**Limited Duration.** The Department will not use Title 10 forces for continuing, on-going, long-term operational support commitments at the same location. Title 10 support is limited to short-term, non-repetitive assistance that involves militarily unique skills.

**Engineer Support (Mobility and Countermobility) (Limited to Southwest Border)**

- Fences
- Lights
- Roads

**Intelligence Programs (Limited to OSD or Agency-level programs)**

- Collection, analysis and dissemination
- Imagery/Mapping
- Foreign language translation/interpreter
- Support will be provided only pursuant to written agreements between the requesting agency headquarters and the Office of the Secretary of Defense

**Training Support**

- Training is limited to non-repetitive “train the trainer” support in military unique skills sets and techniques that assists domestic counternarcotics law enforcement agencies in the development of *intrinsic capabilities*

**Specialty Support**

- Diver support for ship inspections

## Appendix D

### Approval Procedures for Title 10, United States Code, Domestic Counter narcotics Support

For all requests for Title 10, United States Code (Title 10), support sent to U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the Commander, NORTHCOM will first ensure the State National Guard cannot provide the support. If not, NORTHCOM will determine whether the requested support is feasible, supportable, and consistent with Department policy. If approval is authorized under CJCSI 3710.01, the Commander, NORTHCOM may approve the support request. The Commander, NORTHCOM will forward all other requests through the Joint Staff deployment order process, to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), for consideration.

For all requests sent directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter narcotics (DASD (CN)), will, in coordination with the services, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD (HLD)), the Joint Staff, and other appropriate agencies, refer the requests first to the National Guard Bureau. If the National Guard cannot provide the support, DASD (CN) will refer the request, through the Joint Staff, to the Commander, NORTHCOM for review. If feasible and supportable, the Commander, NORTHCOM will request forces, through the Joint Staff, from the appropriate service.

All support requests will include the following:

- a) The identity of the official/agency who requested the support.
- b) Mission of the Department personnel involved and the unit sourced.
- c) Numbers of personnel involved.
- d) Proposed dates of the operation.
- e) Explanation of the counterdrug activities nexus for the mission.
- f) Source of funding.
- g) Citation of statutory and other legal authority for providing the support.
- h) Command relationships.
- i) Brief review of the risk involved to U.S. personnel.
- j) Whether or not personnel will be armed, and the nature of the armament.
- k) Applicable rules for the use of force (RUF) as well as limitations on participation.
- l) Explanation of why existing Title 32 resources cannot execute the mission.
- m) Explanation of why the Department of Homeland Security cannot provide the requested support.

## Appendix E

### Title 32, United States Code, Support

The Secretary of Defense is the approval authority for Department-funded counternarcotics missions that use forces in Title 32, United States Code (Title 32) status, through the Governor's annual State Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities Plans process (32 USC 112). The Department's Title 10, United States Code, and Title 32, United States Code, counterdrug activities must be coordinated to insure the efficient use of Department resources.

When using Defense counternarcotics funds, states may execute only those missions that have been approved by the Secretary of Defense within the Governor's State Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities Plans.

Title 32 militarily unique support to Federal, State or local counternarcotics law enforcement agencies may include:

#### Technical Support

- Linguist/Transcription
- Investigative Case and Intelligence Analysis Support
- Imagery/Mapping
- Communications Support
- Engineer Support
- Subsurface/Diver Support

#### General Support

- Eradication Operations Support (excludes contraband destruction)
- Transportation Support
- Counterdrug-related Training
- Program Management

#### Reconnaissance/Observation

- Surface Reconnaissance
- Aerial Reconnaissance

#### Drug Demand Reduction Outreach

Department counternarcotics funds must be used in compliance with regulatory guidance and applicable Departmental policy. Department counternarcotics funds may be used to support the National Guard counterdrug schools until an appropriate federal agency assumes the responsibility.

## Appendix F

### Approval Procedures for Title 32, United States Code, Domestic Counternarcotics Support

- The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics (DASD (CN)), in coordination with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD (HLD)), the Joint Staff, and other appropriate offices, shall provide annual policy guidance to the Adjutants General via the National Guard Bureau. This annual policy guidance shall identify specific requirements for inclusion in the Governor's annual State Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities Plans (State Plans). Prior to issuance of the annual guidance, the Commander, NORTHCOM, may, via the Joint Staff, provide input to DASD (CN).
- The National Guard Counterdrug Coordinators, through their respective states and territories, shall submit State Plans to the National Guard Bureau (ATTN: Counternarcotics Office) for review.
- The National Guard Bureau shall submit the State Plans, complete with original certifying signatures from the respective Adjutants General, Attorneys General, and Governors, to DASD (CN).
- DASD (CN) shall review the State Plans and, in coordination with the Comptroller, ASD (HLD), the Joint Staff, the Commander, NORTHCOM, and other appropriate offices within the Department, recommend approval or disapproval of the State Plans to the Secretary of Defense.
- During the year of execution, Federal agency requests for support shall be submitted to and approved by the respective Adjutants General. Requests from Federal agencies not supportable by a State may be forwarded by the State CDC to the Commander, NORTHCOM, via the National Guard Bureau and the Joint Staff, for consideration.



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

OCT 3 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Department of Defense International Counternarcotics Policy

International narcotics trafficking, and its linkage with international terrorism, is a threat to the national security interests of the United States. Global and regional terrorists who threaten United States interests finance their activities with the proceeds from narcotics trafficking.

Department counternarcotics (CN)-funded resources and operations can detect, monitor and support the interdiction, disruption or curtailment of emerging narcotics-related threats to our national security. CN authorities and funding are an effective combination that supports war on terrorism efforts and the implementation of the Department's Security Cooperation Guidance.

Pursuant, therefore, to the Department's counternarcotics policy dated July 31, 2002, this memorandum provides policy guidance for the Department's international counternarcotics operations and the Department's counternarcotics support to U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies and security forces. This policy is effective on October 1, 2003. This policy supercedes the international aspects of the Secretary of Defense policy memorandum "Military Support to Counternarcotics Activities", dated October 6, 1998.

*Paul Wolfowitz*



U15091 /03

Appendix A

General International Counternarcotics Policy Implementation Guidelines

Appendix B

Criteria for Approval of Requests for International Support

Appendix C

Department International Counternarcotics Support

Appendix D

Approval Procedures for Department International Counternarcotics Support

## Appendix A

### General International Counternarcotics Policy Implementation Guidelines

- Department personnel will not directly participate in law enforcement activities to include searches, seizures, arrests, or similar activity unless such personnel are otherwise authorized to do so by law
- Department personnel will not accompany U.S. drug law enforcement agents or host nation law enforcement and security forces on actual counternarcotics field operations or participate in any activity in which related hostilities are imminent. Department personnel shall make every effort to minimize the possibility of confrontation with civilians.
- Department personnel will provide counternarcotics support from a secure base or area. If included as part of an approved deployment order, Department personnel may proceed to a forward operating base or area in accordance with the deployment order when directed by the responsible Commander or other official designated by the Commander.
- The Department will support international counternarcotics programs that contribute to:
  - the War on Terrorism;
  - Security Cooperation Guidance;
  - Military readiness; and
  - National Security.

**Appendix B****Criteria for Approval of Requests for International Support**

All requests for Department support must satisfy the following criteria prior to approval:

**Valid Counterdrug Activities Nexus.** This is the prime factor in considering support to U.S. and foreign drug law enforcement agencies and foreign security forces with counterdrug responsibilities. The term "counterdrug activities" includes those measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail any activity that is reasonably related to narcotics trafficking. This includes, but is not limited to, measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail activities related to substances, materiel, weapons or resources used to finance, support, secure, cultivate, process, or transport illegal drugs.

**Proper Request.**

- An appropriate official of a Federal department or agency who has responsibility for counternarcotics activities must request the support (refer to §1004(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991, as amended).
- Federal law must authorize the Department to provide the requested support (refer to §1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991).
- The support will assist the requesting agency or the relevant foreign drug law enforcement agency or security force with drug enforcement responsibilities in accomplishing its counternarcotics objectives.
- The support is consistent with the Department's implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy and war on terrorism priorities.

**Readiness.** The Department may provide international counternarcotics support as long as that support enhances unit readiness or mission capability.

## **Appendix C**

### **Department International Counternarcotics Support**

Department CN support should be oriented to the greatest extent feasible toward supporting the War on Terrorism and the Department's Security Cooperation Guidance, consistent with Appendix B.

#### **Deployments**

Department CN-funded deployments:

- Must provide training for foreign drug law enforcement agencies and security forces with counterdrug responsibilities, and;
- Must be planned and executed as counter-narcoterrorism (CNT) deployments that support the War on Terrorism:
  - Focus on disrupting the drug trade and related finance flows of groups such as al Qaeda, the Colombian FARC, et. al., and/or training friendly foreign military forces with similar responsibilities; or
- Must pursue narcoterrorist-related activities; or
- Must contribute to the operational preparation of the battlespace or advance-force operations.

#### **Infrastructure Support**

- Infrastructure support must:
  - Support a specific Department-supported counter-narcoterrorist activity or program; and
  - Enable or support operational preparation of the battlespace or advance-force operations for future U.S. counter-narcoterrorist operations.

#### **Intelligence Support**

- Intelligence support must:

- Relate to the collection, analysis and dissemination of counter-narcoterrorist intelligence; and
- May also be to provide imagery/mapping or training in intelligence skills and operations to support counter-narcoterrorism.

**Operational Support**

- Must be related to:
  - Detection and monitoring operations.
  - Operation of bases of operation or training centers.
  - Training in operations planning; or
  - Transportation.

## Appendix D

### Approval Procedures for Department International Counternarcotics Support

#### Requests for Support

Requests for international counternarcotics support may be sent by law enforcement agencies to the relevant Combatant Commander or the Office of Counternarcotics for processing.

#### Approval Authority

- Requests for support must be processed in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3710.01, as updated.
- The Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense must approve all other requests for foreign deployments.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy must approve all other requests for international counternarcotics support, exclusive of deployments.
- The Joint Staff shall forward requests for support, with a recommendation, to the Office of Counternarcotics.
- The Office of Counternarcotics will coordinate the request with the Office of the General Counsel and the Department of State before submitting the request to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for review and submission to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense for approval.
- DoD personnel shall not travel into a foreign country in connection with international counternarcotics support unless the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense has approved the movement, or has specifically delegated that approval authority to the respective Combatant Commander, a Service, or the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

#### Requests for Deployment Orders

Combatant Commanders will forward requests for deployment orders (RDOs) to the Joint Staff. RDOs must include the following information:

- Name and specific position title of the official who requested the support;
- Mission of Department personnel involved and the source of the Department supporting personnel (in-theater assigned or other-than-theater assigned);
- Number of Department personnel involved;
- Proposed dates of the deployment including the dates of arrival in and departure from the host nation;
- Status of approval of the deployment by the host country (name and specific position of the host nation official granting approval), U.S. Chief of Mission, and appropriate Commander;
- Explanation of how the requested deployment is related to counternarcotics and information relating to the benefit to the Department's:
  - War on Terrorism;
  - Security cooperation objectives;
  - Readiness; or
  - National security.
- Source of funding;
- Citation of statutory and other legal authority for providing the support;
- Command relationships;
- Review of the risk to U.S. personnel;
- Statement regarding whether Department personnel will be armed and, if so, the nature of the armament;
- Applicable rules of engagement as well as limitations on participation by Department personnel in law enforcement activities, counternarcotics field operations, and any activity in which hostilities are imminent;
- Statement regarding the legal status of Department personnel deployed in the foreign nation; and

- Statement regarding human rights verification of the individuals or units receiving the training. The certification must be made within 270 days of the starting date of the proposed training.

**Requests for Other CN Support**

Requests for CN support to countries not identified in the Department's Security Cooperation Guidance should include as much of the above elements of information as necessary to allow the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to judge whether it can be approved under the criteria in Appendix B.

Requests for CN-funded infrastructure projects should include an operational assessment by the relevant Combatant Commander.

Knight Ridder Washington Bureau  
May 5, 2004, Wednesday

## Heroin boom in Afghanistan overwhelms border nations

By Mark McDonald

DUSHANBE, Tajikistan \_ Heroin producers in Afghanistan, some of the principal financiers of al-Qaida and other terrorists, have never before been so brazen or so wealthy.

With a bumper crop of opium poppies under cultivation, Afghan narco-barons have begun stamping their brand names on the 2.2-pound bags of heroin they smuggle out of Central Asia to buyers in Moscow, Amsterdam, London and New York.

Sacks of high-quality Afghan heroin seized last week in Tajikistan carried the trademarks "Super Power" and "555." Some of the sacks, which were hidden inside foil-lined containers of instant cappuccino mix, even included the addresses of the labs in Afghanistan where the heroin had been refined.

A Western-led campaign against opium-growing and heroin laboratories has been a wholesale failure, and drug-control experts say the number of processing facilities in Afghanistan has exploded over the last year. The trade and huge sums of money involved threaten to undermine vulnerable bordering states such as Tajikistan.

"There's absolutely no threat to the labs inside Afghanistan," said Maj. Avaz Yuldashov of the Tajikistan Drug Control Agency. "Our intelligence shows there are 400 labs making heroin there, and 80 of them are situated right along our border. Some of them even work outside, in the open air."

Some 200,000 acres of opium poppies have been planted in Afghanistan \_ opium serves as the raw material of heroin \_ and the country's late-summer harvest will produce three-fourths of the world's heroin. That will mean further billions for growers, smugglers, corrupt officials and Afghan warlords.

It's also likely to mean a windfall of tithes to al-Qaida and its Islamist brethren said to be regrouping in the mountains of Central Asia.

"Drug trafficking from Afghanistan is the main source of support for international terrorism now," Yuldashov said. "That's quite clear."

But in recent congressional testimony about heroin flow out of Afghanistan, Drug Enforcement Administration head Karen Tandy spoke only of "potential links" and "possible relationships" between Afghan traffickers and terrorists. Drug agents in Central

Asia say they're baffled by Tandy's hedging.

"The connection is absolutely obvious to us," said Col. Alexander Kondratiyev, a senior Russian officer who has served with border guards in Tajikistan for nearly a decade. "Drugs, weapons, ammunition, terrorism, more drugs, more terrorism \_ it's a closed circle."

That circle has profound and ominous implications for the U.S.-led fight against international terrorism. Regional diplomats, aid workers and law-enforcement officials fear that the expanding drug trade will destabilize one of the "stans," the five former Soviet republics that gained independence after the U.S.S.R. collapsed.

They worry about the emergence of a Central Asian narco-state, a country dominated by the drug economy and effectively controlled by a heroin mafia with roots in Afghanistan and ties to al-Qaida and regional Islamists.

"We have a deep responsibility to keep these Central Asian republics from becoming failed states," said a Western diplomat in Dushanbe who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Look what happened in Afghanistan. It was a failed state \_ and it became a nest for terrorists.

"We have to stop that same thing from happening here. For our own security, we can't afford it."

At particular risk is Tajikistan, a desperately poor, predominantly Muslim nation of 7 million.

Tajikistan produces almost no opium or heroin of its own, but it has become a natural pathway for traffickers due to its 900-mile border with Afghanistan. Also, enough heroin has been "falling off the trucks" in Tajikistan that it now has galloping rates of heroin addiction, drug crime and HIV infection.

The Tajik Drug Control Agency \_ outmanned, outgunned and poorly equipped \_ said it managed to seize nearly 6 tons of heroin from traffickers last year. Senior commanders estimate they catch about 20 percent of the traffic. Some analysts think it's probably about half that much.

Tajikistan, isolated and landlocked, has almost no industrial economy other than a state-controlled aluminum smelter. Foreign investment is minuscule; not a single American firm is operating in the country. "Nobody even comes to look anymore," said a foreign diplomat, who also asked not to be named.

The national budget is barely \$300 million a year, a pittance compared with the size of the drug economy. The heroin trade alone, Yuldashov said, is 10 times bigger.

That kind of disparity leaves many Tajiks vulnerable to corruption and compromise by

wealthy drug mafiosi, especially when the average salary is \$10 a month and 80 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. A single trip as a drug courier can feed a Tajik family for a month.

Another worrisome development is in the offing for Tajikistan: Next month, along the Afghan border, Russia will begin withdrawing 2,200 border-control officers who've been stationed here since the Soviet era. Their departure and the loss of Russian funding could further undermine Tajikistan's ability to defend itself from Afghan drug traffickers.

Tajik officers and army conscripts will take over from the Russians, although they'll have no night-vision equipment, satellite phones or helicopters. Even now, many of the border posts lack two-way radios and binoculars.

It remains to be seen whether European countries, the target destinations for much of Afghanistan's opium and heroin, will pick up the slack. The United States contributes to U.N. drug programs in the region, but the DEA has only a minimal presence here in terms of human intelligence: The DEA has deployed two agents to cover all of Afghanistan. There are no DEA agents in Tajikistan or neighboring Kyrgyzstan, another paradise for traffickers.

"We know shockingly little about how the drug trade operates out here," said a Western official who asked not to be identified.

Heroin moves out of Afghanistan via the so-called southern route \_ through Iran or Pakistan \_ or the northern route, which makes its way through the Central Asian "stans."

It's unknown how much drug traffic passes through Turkmenistan. The secretive nation doesn't release information on drug seizures and no longer cooperates with regional drug-control initiatives.

"They have open borders with Afghanistan, but not even the U.N. knows what they're doing" about drug trafficking, said Kamol Dusmetov, the head of the Uzbek National Center for Drug Control.

Heroin is carried out of Afghanistan in vegetable trucks, fuel tankers and donkey carts. It's hidden in women's underwear, children's backpacks or sacks of pistachios.

In Tajikistan, well-organized teams of couriers wade across the Amu Daria and Pyanj rivers, usually at night, backed up by accomplices armed with satellite phones, off-road vehicles, bales of bribe money and plenty of heavy weapons. In one recent seizure, troopers found \$280,000 in cash stuffed among the 1-kilogram bags of heroin.

In Uzbekistan, which has an 80-mile border with Afghanistan, smuggling can be more rudimentary.

Dusmetov said rural couriers sometimes forced their dogs and donkeys to swallow

balloons full of heroin. They tie a string to the balloons and wrap the other end of the string around the animal's tooth. Once across the border, the smuggler pulls the string and retrieves the balloons.

"Borders (throughout the region) are not guarded well," Dusmetov said. "In many places, like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, borders are virtually open. You jump across a ditch and you're in another country."

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